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This thesis poses three questions: What is one-party dominance? What factors 
have been identified as encouraging the development of dominant parties in genuinely 
democratic systems? Do these characteristics apply to the conservative party in South 
Korea? This thesis focuses on pork barrel politics, fragmentation of opposition parties, 
and partisan control of the media as possible factors encouraging one-party dominance. 
To what extent are these structural advantages that the conservatives might hold in 
government and society, and could these lead to dominance by the conservative party? 
The thesis finds that the conservatives and progressives both take part in pork barrel 
politics and both influence the media; the progressive party is more fragmented than the 
conservatives and this gives the conservatives an advantage, but only a weak one. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis will examine the prospects for one-party dominance in South Korea. 
Specifically, is South Korea’s conservative party (which has taken different names at 
different times) likely to become a dominant party and create a one-party dominant 
system somewhat like Japan’s, or are South Korea’s progressives in a position to force 
alternation in power? The thesis will pursue the following main questions: 
 What is the definition of one-party dominance? 
 What factors encourage the development of dominant parties in genuinely 
democratic systems? 
 Do these characteristics apply to the conservative party in South Korea? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since South Korea began holding direct free elections in 1987, two well-
institutionalized political parties have emerged: the conservative Saenuri Party and the 
progressive New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD) (these are the parties’ current 
names; they have used different names in the past).1 The conservative party is the 
descendant of the authoritarian regime that ruled South Korea from 1948 to 1987. The 
progressives are the descendants of the opponents of that authoritarian regime. While the 
conservative party was able to maintain power after democratization, it was only able to 
hold onto the powerful South Korea presidency for ten years. In 1997, there was a shift in 
power to the progressive presidency. Then from 2007 until the present day, the 
conservatives have again held power. 
Despite this recent history, it is unclear if alternation of power (as chiefly defined 
by control of the presidency) will continue. The conservatives might still become a one-
                                                 
1 The actual names of the parties have often changed since 1987. The conservative party was also 
known as the Democratic Justice Party, Democratic Liberal Party, New Korea Party and the Grand 
National Party. The progressive party was also known as the Party for Peace and Democracy, Democratic 
Party, National Congress for New Politics, Millennium Democratic Party, United New Democratic Party 
and Democratic United Party. 
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party dominant regime, following the trajectory of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of 
Japan. Immediately after World War II, the LDP’s conservative predecessors lost power 
to a progressive party, but managed to recapture it not long after. By 1955 the current 
LDP had formed and it has held power ever since, with the exception of short periods 
from 1993–1994 and 2009–2012. Although the LDP’s opponents seemed poised to 
become a regular challenger to the LDP and alternative in power, this potential has yet to 
be fully realized. Though the conservatives in South Korea have already ceded the 
presidency for longer than the LDP has ever ceded the cabinet, they have maintained 
power through authoritarianism from 1948 to 1987, and by 2017 will have maintained 
power under democracy for 20 of the last 30 years. As the more established party, the 
conservatives seem to have inherent advantages over the progressives; however, it is not 
clear if the system is evolving this way. 
The prospect of one-party dominance in South Korea is worth investigating not 
only because it is an open question, but also because the answer matters. In South Korea, 
the political party in power strongly influences foreign and security policy outcomes. For 
example, South Korea’s policy toward North Korea, the South’s most important foreign 
and security policy issue, underwent a dramatic change during progressive rule. When the 
progressives took power in 1998, President Kim Dae-jung implemented the Sunshine 
Policy, an “open door” policy that sought cooperation without placing restrictions on 
North Korea for non-compliance.2 The conservative side, on the other hand, has taken a 
more firm stance against North Korea, and has also more consistently supported the 
maintenance of the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance. When the conservatives took 
power during the 2007 elections, the Sunshine Policy was eliminated, and South Korea 
returned to hardline policies against North Korea.3 
One-party dominance has also been thought to impact policy within South Korea; 
although opinions are split as to whether this has mainly positive or negative effects.4 
                                                 
2 Hyung-gu Lynn, Bipolar Orders: The Two Koreas since 1989 (New York: Zed Books, 2007), 53. 
3 Scott Snyder, “Lee Myung-bak’s Foreign Policy: A 250-Day Assessment,” Asia Foundation, March 
16, 2009, https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/SnyderLMBForeignPolicyKJDA.pdf. 
4 Dorothy J. Solinger, “Ending One-Party Dominance: Korea, Taiwan, Mexico,” Journal of 
Democracy 12, no. 1 (January 2001): 400, doi: 10.1353/jod.2001.0017. 
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The advantage of one-party dominance is policy stability; there is little chance that a 
comprehensive change will occur causing a drastic change in policy (assuming the 
dominant party itself consistently favors a single policy). Furthermore, while dominant 
parties might provide more policy stability, they also might hurt democratic 
responsiveness, encourage corruption and pork barrel politics, and marginalize political 
opponents.5 Once firmly established in power, the dominant party could establish laws 
that benefit itself, possibly to the extent that it transforms the country into a semi-
democracy.6 Additionally, with unchecked power, gross amounts of gerrymandering 
could result, encouraging corruption and blocking the opposition from establishing a 
political presence. 
So far, the conservative party of South Korea has been closely aligned with the 
policy outlook of the United States. Historically, South Korea’s authoritarian regime and 
successor conservative party have closely aligned the country toward the United States; 
when the regime changed to the progressive party, this alliance was certainly maintained, 
but South Korea displayed the greatest degree of anti-Americanism in its history. This 
suggests that policymakers in the United States might prefer the conservatives to become 
dominant in South Korea and expect them to better support U.S. policy on the Korean 
peninsula. Even if U.S. policy preferences are put aside, dominance by the conservatives 
in South Korea might be expected to preserve the status quo of relations between the two 
countries. Therefore, understanding the sources that might create a one-party dominant 
regime could allow United States policymakers not only to measure the strength and 
weakness of the incumbent party but also to assess the likely future trajectory of South 
Korea foreign policy and thereby to better equip themselves to manage that alliance. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review is divided into two sections. The first will deal with the 
definition of one-party dominance: what constitutes dominance? The second will deal 
                                                 
5 Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins, “The Dominant Party Regimes of South Africa, Mexico, 
Taiwan and Malaysia: A Comparative Assessment,” in The Awkward Embrace: One-Party Domination and 
Democracy, eds. Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins (Melbourne, Australia: Harwood, 2005), 14. 
6 Ibid. 
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with the causes of one-party dominance: what is thought to encourage or discourage one-
party dominance? This thesis considers one-party dominance in the context of democracy 
and genuine political competition; dominant parties within authoritarian regimes are 
mostly ignored. 
Pempel defines democracy as featuring “free electoral competition, relatively 
open information systems, respect for civil liberties, and the right of free political 
association.”7 In this context, he finds that scholars provide only vague or narrow 
definitions of one-party dominance. Sartori, for example, simply holds that one-party 
dominance indicates a dominant party’s being stronger than its competitors.8 McDonald, 
in the context of Latin America, defines a dominant party (or coalition) as one able to 
obtain a minimum of 60% of legislative seats.9 Although he notes the lack of a clear 
definition, he concedes that it is impossible to establish a universal definition to describe 
one-party dominance. 
Pempel instead establishes four dimensions that are prevalent among one-party 
dominant systems: parties that satisfy all of these features are considered dominant. In 
practice, though, two of Pempel’s criteria seem more fundamental than his other two: 
dominance in number and dominance chronologically. 
A party dominant in number is one that wins a preponderance of important 
political offices. In practice, this usually indicates seats in the national legislature.10 
According to Pempel, what constitutes this preponderance depends on the number of 
parties. If a country has only two parties, then holding at least 50% of legislative seats 
would satisfy the definition of dominance. But in the many countries with a multiparty 
system, less than 50% of seats in government might still be formidable.11 Therefore, in a 
multi-party system, Pempel sets the standard at 35% (though he recognizes that this is 
                                                 
7 T. J. Pempel, Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
Univ. Press, 1990), 1. 
8 Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, vol. 1 (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1976), 193. 
9 Ronald H. McDonald, Party Systems and Elections in Latin America (Chicago: Markham, 1971), 
220. 
10 Pempel, Uncommon Democracies, 336. 
11 Ibid. 
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arbitrarily precise).12 This standard assumes that opposition parties are too fragmented, 
ideologically or otherwise, to form a coalition against the dominant party.13 If anything, 
as Horowitz argues, such a dominant party is often able to form alliances with minor 
parties to benefit mutually in elections.14 This implies that a dominant party must be the 
largest single party and control government either alone or in a coalition with weaker 
partners. Parties that are the single biggest party but that lose to another multi-party 
coalition do not qualify. 
While Pempel focuses on legislatures, his definition of “dominance in number” 
suggests that a dominant party must also win the presidency, if one exists in the country 
in question. This must be stipulated because it is possible for a party dominant within the 
legislature not to hold the presidency, in which case it likely fails to be dominant in the 
political system at large. 
Pempel’s second criterion is that a dominant party must be dominant 
chronologically: the party has to hold power for a long time.15 While scholars often 
discuss this general concept, they rarely define it concretely. Pempel only attempts to 
define chronological dominance by setting a minimum requirement of more than a few 
years.16 In most cases, scholars define chronological dominance by reference to particular 
parties rather than a general standard. Parties commonly considered chronologically 
dominant include Japan’s LDP (in power for the 38 years from 1955 to 1993 and then for 
19 of the 23 years since then), South Africa’s African National Congress (in power from 
1994 to the present—21 years and counting) and Sweden’s Social Democratic Party (in 
power from 1932 to 1976, or 44 years). Further research may eventually lead to a 
standard minimum definition of chronological dominance. 
Dominance in number and chronologically are usually prior conditions for 
Pempel’s other two criteria: a dominant bargaining position and dominance 
                                                 
12 Pempel, Uncommon Democracies, 336. 
13 Ibid., 3–4. 
14 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1985), 328. 
15 Pempel, Uncommon Democracies, 3–4. 
16 Ibid. 
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governmentally (i.e., the execution of historical projects and setting of a durable national 
policy agenda).17 These aspects of dominance are analytically separate from—but usually 
follow directly from—dominance in number and over time. Furthermore, a party that 
enjoys plurality legislative strength will only fail to have a dominant bargaining position 
if it meets the following conditions. It holds a plurality but not a majority and it faces a 
larger, multi-party coalition that is not considered dominant in number in the first place. 
In a presidential system like South Korea’s, a party that establishes dominance in number 
by winning the presidency will normally enjoy dominant bargaining power against all but 
the strongest legislative supermajorities (though South Korea’s system gives bargaining 
power even to minority parties, as outlined in the following discussion). Similarly, parties 
that enjoy both dominance in number and dominance over time are usually at least in a 
position to establish dominance governmentally and set the national agenda. If such a 
party fails to set the national agenda, one might classify it as a dominant party that 
squandered its potential rather than one that was not dominant at all. In this sense, 
dominance in number and chronologically seem sufficient as twin criteria of dominance. 
Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party can be seen as an example of a party that 
satisfies all four of Pempel’s criteria. As noted previously, between 1958 and the present 
it has governed for all but four years, usually amassing single-party majorities in the 
national legislature and often either large single-party or coalition majorities. When the 
LDP was the dominant party, it was able to hold a minimum of 44% of parliament 
seats.18 Their next strongest opponents only managed a maximum of 36% of parliament 
seats..19 Based on their dominance in number and over time in parliament, they were able 
to set Japan’s policy agenda in economics, security, and foreign policy.20 
The second portion of the thesis will focus on the causes of one-party dominance. 
Scholars have pointed to a number of factors.  
                                                 
17 Pempel, Uncommon Democracies, 4. 
18 “Japan: Parliamentary Elections Shugiin, 1993,” Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), 1993, 
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2161_93.htm. 
19 Dieter Nohlen, Florian Grotz, and Christof Hartmann, eds., Elections in Asia: A Data Handbook, 
vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001), 381. 
20 Pempel, Uncommon Democracies, 24–29. 
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One possible cause of single-party dominance is historical circumstances; a party 
may be so closely identified with the country’s national identity that it essentially “owns” 
a reputation as the “natural” party of government. The African National Congress (ANC) 
in South Africa, by virtue of its leadership in eliminating apartheid and official 
discrimination and establishing universal suffrage, is sometimes viewed as synonymous 
with the modern democratic South African state. During the 1994 elections, the party was 
able to secure more than 60% of the vote, giving it a majority in the National 
Assembly.21 
Dominant parties also gain their status through flexibility in policy. Parties that 
become dominant often prove willing and able to steal good opposition ideas, as opposed 
to remaining rigid ideologically. Before Japan’s LDP had clearly established dominance, 
the party looked fated to lose to their opponents eventually; however, the party flexibly 
turned its attention away from the security treaty issues that drew massive protests and 
instead shifted focus to the economy through a double-the-income policy that ushered in 
the “economic miracle” of the 1960s. The party later transformed itself from a growth-
only party into a party that also dealt with the undesirable by-products of that growth, 
such as environmental damage and a perception of insufficient emphasis on consumer (as 
opposed to business and producer) interests and social welfare.22 When the LDP was 
created in 1955, the party subsidized rural farmers and business owners. When these 
expenditures exceeded tax revenues, the LDP’s ability to adapt to this changing 
environment kept the party popular with the public. During the 1970s, citizen movements 
were on the rise, demanding “increased government spending to improve social welfare 
programs and to address problems of pollution.”23 The LDP recognized these demands 
and quickly acted to meet them. Under the guidance of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, 
under a slow economy, the LDP pursued positive-sum politics by implementing 
Keynesian economic policy to stimulate the economy and government revenue.24 The 
                                                 
21 Giliomee and Simkins, “Dominant Party Regimes,” 15. 
22 Gerald L. Curtis, The Japanese Way of Politics (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1988), 53. 
23 Ibid., 47. 
24 Curtis, Japanese Way of Politics, 47. 
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LDP’s flexibility (aided by the expanding revenues that it had a hand in producing) 
ultimately allowed it to identify itself with both economic growth and many potential 
critics of growth. 
Dominant parties are also able to use clientelism to their advantage. The breadth 
of public funds available to incumbents helps them entrench themselves. Japan’s LDP 
took advantage of this system by appealing to voters through clientelism. As the 
incumbents, the LDP was able to use government funds to “reward its supporters, to 
cultivate new support, and to reorder the government’s policy priorities.”25 
Dominant parties are also able to take advantage of the fragmentation of the 
opposition. This may reflect opposition parties’ ideological and/or organizational rigidity 
and incompatibility. In Japan, in contrast to the LDP with its ability and willingness to 
adapt to changing environments, the LDP’s opponents long put ideology above votes. 
LDP candidates running for a district may have disagreed on party policy; however, once 
elected, the LDP as an organization put party agenda above personal ideology. The 
LDP’s longtime socialist opposition, though, was not particularly pragmatic as an 
organization.26 When opportunity appeared for the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) to move to 
the political center, the left-leaning core of the party prevented the party from doing so.27 
Internal strife within the JSP would see party members breaking away to form different 
parties. The formation of these parties only assisted the LDP staying in power. During the 
mid-1970s, there were five main opposition parties in Japan.28 While they were able to 
steal votes and Diet seats from the LDP, these parties were unable to develop into major 
parties and assisted the LDP by fragmenting votes among themselves.29 None of the 
minor, non-JSP opposition parties regularly received more than 10% of the vote in 
national elections.30 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 46. 
26 Ibid., 16. 
27 Ibid., 18. 
28 Ibid., 20. 
29 Ibid., 21. 
30 Curtis, Japanese Way of Politics, 21. 
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Electoral systems can also contribute to one-party dominance. Before 1996, Japan 
operated under a single non-transferable vote system with multi-member districts, which 
encouraged multiple members of the same large party to run in the same district, but also 
encouraged multiple small parties to run against each other rather than unite behind a 
single standard-bearer.31 This entrenched the LDP in government by encouraging them to 
appeal to voters using clientelism, while discouraging small opposition parties from 
working together or causing larger opposition parties to split into smaller ones in the first 
place.32 
A party might also entrench itself in power based on the support of the 
international community, including the United States. During the Cold War, the United 
States saw Japan—and the LDP in particular—as a valuable ally to fight communism in 
the area. The United States encouraged both the transformation of the Japanese economic 
system and the development of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Presently, the United 
States and Japan’s conservative party maintains a strong economic and foreign policy 
partnership. 
D. STATE OF AND POTENTIAL FOR ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE IN 
SOUTH KOREA 
1. Dominance in Number, Bargaining Position, Chronology? 
After democratization, the South Korean presidency was held by conservatives 
for ten years (1988–1998), followed by the progressives for ten years (1998–2008), and 
again by the conservatives for another ten years (2008–2018). Each ten-year period 
included two successive five-year presidential terms (Korean presidents are limited to a 
single term). The presidency not only has alternated between parties but also has usually 
been won by only modest margins. In the 1987 elections, conservative Roh Tae-woo won 
the presidency with 36.6% of the popular vote, a difference of only 8.6% over his closest 
rival.33 In 1992, conservative Kim Young-sam received 42% of the popular vote, again 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 10. 
32 Ibid., 214. 
33 Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann, Elections in Asia, 420. 
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only 8.2% from his closest opponent.34 When progressive Kim Dae-jung won in 1997, he 
captured 40.3% of the votes; a difference of 1.6% from his conservative rival.35 When the 
progressives were returned to office in 2002, Roh Moo-hyun was able to capture 48.91% 
of the votes; a difference of 2.32% from his conservative rival.36 When the conservatives 
recaptured the presidency in 2007, President Lee Myung-bak won in a rare landslide with 
only 48.7% of the votes, but 22.6% more than his progressive rival.37 Five years later, 
when President Park Geun-hye was elected in 2012, she was able to obtain 51.6% of the 
votes, but defeated her progressive opponent by 3.6%38 
In the national legislature, with the exception of 2004, the conservatives won 
more seats than their competitors, but not always the majority of seats. The Korean 
legislature has 299 seats, requiring a party to hold 150 seats to win the majority. During 
the presidency of Roh Tae-woo from 1988–1993, there were two legislative elections. In 
the legislative elections of 1988, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) (Conservative) was 
able to obtain 125 seats; however, they were unable to craft a durable majority coalition 
to support President Roh.39 For four years of President Roh’s presidency, he did not have 
control over the legislature. During the 1992 elections, the Democratic Liberal Party 
(Conservative) was able to obtain 149 seats, one shy of a majority.40 However, the DLP 
was able to form a coalition with ten independents, giving them a majority with 159 
seats. During the presidency of Kim Young-sam from 1993 to 1998, two legislative 
elections were held. In the 1996 legislative elections, the New Korea Party 
(Conservative) was able to obtain 139 seats.41 While they did not have a majority, they 
                                                 
34 Uk Heo and Terrence Roehrig, South Korea since 1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), 
44. 
35 Ibid., 39. 
36 “Elections: South Korea Presidential Dec. 19, 2002,” ElectionGuide, 2015, 
http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/1879/. 
37 “Elections: South Korea Pres Dec. 19, 2007,” ElectionGuide, 2015, http://www.electionguide.org/
elections/id/2057/. 
38 “Elections: South Korea Presidential Dec. 2012,” ElectionGuide, 2015, 
http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2255/. 
39 Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann, Elections in Asia, 420. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann, Elections in Asia, 420. 
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were able to form majority coalitions. This effectively gave Kim a friendly legislature for 
his entire presidency. When Progressives took the presidency in 1998, they did not enjoy 
a legislative majority and this situation continued after the 2000 legislative elections, 
when the Grand National Party (Conservative) was able to win 133 seats (in a legislature 
temporarily reduced to 273 seats from the usual 299), compared to the Millennium 
Democratic Party’s (Progressive) 115 seats.42 In the 2004 elections, the Uri party 
(Progressive) won 152 seats of 299 seats to achieve a majority, while the conservative 
Grand National Party was only able to obtain 121 seats.43 This marked the first time the 
progressives controlled the legislature outright. When the conservatives returned to the 
presidency, they were able to obtain a majority outright without coalition partners. In the 
2008 legislative elections, the Saenuri (Conservative) party was able to obtain 153 seats, 
and in the 2012 legislature elections, it obtained 152 seats.44 
Since 1988, the conservatives have controlled the legislature for 16 years, eight by 
winning a majority outright and eight through coalitions with minor parties. The 
progressives have only won a majority outright for four years. For eight years, neither 
party was able to capture a majority, even through leadership of a coalition. 
Overall, while the conservative party in South Korea has sometimes been 
dominant in number and bargaining position, it is hard to describe them as dominant 
chronologically. While they have held legislative majorities more often than their 
opponents, this has not been on a consistent basis. 
2. Dominance Governmentally? 
From 1948 until democratic elections were held in 1987, the conservatives were 
in power in the form of an authoritarian regime. This allowed conservatives to shape the 
country’s economic policy. During the authoritarian presidency of Park Chung-hee from 
1961 to 1979, the state developed a close relationship with conglomerates (chaebols), 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 “Republic of Korea: Elections in 2004,” IPU, 2007, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/
2259_04.htm. 
44 “Republic of Korea (Kuk Hoe) Elections in 2008,” IPU, 2012, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/
arc/2259_08.htm. 
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deliberately developing them as economic pillars of Korean society. President Park was 
able to monopolize power and enforce enduring economic policies that were necessary 
for South Korea to grow; he legitimized his rule with results, increasing gross domestic 
product (GDP) yearly from 1963 to 1979.45 
Even when the progressives took power in 1997, there was a limit to how much 
change they could make under the current economic system. The progressives did 
achieve substantial reforms that undercut the strong state-business relationship; they 
started to open the market for small business and allowed small amounts of foreign 
investors into the country as competition.46 Furthermore, they prevented conglomerates 
from remaining family-led enterprises. Chaebols had been family-run companies that 
were passed from generation to the next, with corporate boards dominated by family 
members. Under President Kim Dae-jung, chaebols were newly required to hire 50% of 
board members from outside the company.47 But while the progressives made such 
efforts to limit the power of the chaebols, the Korean government still relies heavily on 
chaebols for economic success. 
When conservative President Lee Myung-bak was elected in 2007, one reason he 
won was the past economic performance of the conservative party; the conservatives still 
enjoy the legacy of past economic performance. Based upon this data, the conservative 
party in South Korea should be dominant governmentally; however, this depends on the 
demands of civil society. If and when the most important issue is the economy, the 
conservatives have an advantage, but if and when voters’ concerns shift to civil rights and 
democratic processes, the conservative party may have a disadvantage, as they are linked 
to the authoritarian regime. 
                                                 
45 Chalmers Johnson, “Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government–Business 
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Industrialism, ed. Frederic C. Deyo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987), 1311. 
46 Andrew Macintyre, T. J. Pempel, and John Ravenhill, Crisis as Catalyst: Asia’s Dynamic Political 
Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2008), 79. 
47 Ibid., 81. 
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3. Potential Factors Encouraging One-Party Dominance in South Korea 
When analyzing the causes of one-party dominance, there are a plethora of 
potential factors. While this thesis will not go into an in-depth discussion of these 
potential factors, this section presents factors that may cause one-party dominance in 
South Korea. 
Unlike the LDP in Japan, pragmatism and opposition dogmatism does not seem to 
favor one party exclusively in South Korea; factors that caused conservatives to win 
elections have varied. During the 2007 presidential election, the opposition managed to 
undermine its own pragmatism. Lee Myung-bak (Conservative) defeated Chung Dong-
young (Progressive) by 48.7% of the vote to 26.1%.48 One of the reasons for the 
progressive defeat was the failure of ex-President Roh Moo-hyun to uphold his anti-
corruption stance while in office. Since authoritarian rule, there has always existed a 
close relationship between the government and big businesses (chaebol); this often leads 
to corruption of government officials. Roh’s predecessor, Kim Dae-jung, championed the 
same approach to rid the government of crony capitalism; however, he ended up violating 
his own policy by using Hyundai Asan as an intermediary to send cash to North Korea. 
Similarly, during President Roh Moo-hyun’s tenure in office, instead of ridding 
corruption, Roh became entangled in a bribery scandal; he was also the first 
democratically elected president to be impeached. 
During 2012 Presidential elections, though, dogmatism did lead the progressives 
to lose. Moon Jae-in (NPAD—Progressive) formed an alliance with ultra-progressive 
candidate Lee Jung-hee (United Progressive Party [UPP]) to rally against Park Guen-hye 
(Saenuri—Conservative Party); however, the UPP only managed to marginalize the New 
Politics Alliance for Democracy. During a televised debate, the UPP attacked the Saenuri 
candidate stating that by voting for the conservatives it would be a return to the Yushin 
constitution (authoritarian rule under President Park Chung-hee); the attacks by UPP 
                                                 
48 “Elections: South Korea Pres Dec. 19, 2007,” ElectionGuide.  
 14
undermined the NPAD campaign.49 The NAPD could not use the same attacks against 
Saenuri; the UPP having a reputation for being a far-left/pro-North, the NAPD could not 
risk using the same attacks and being labeled with the same ideologies as the UPP.50 
Ultimately, the far-left dogmatism of the UPP marginalized the NPAD. 
Furthermore, the conservative party seems to be semi-flexible when it comes to 
policy flexibility. When President Lee Myung-bak attempted to pass his Green Growth 
(GG) policy in 2008, he needed the support of the chaebols. Initially, Heo explains that, 
“large firms, including POSCO, Samsung, and LG, presented strategies supporting the 
Green Growth Policy.”51 However, when the framework of the GG policy was 
introduced, chaebols started to withdraw their support. The chaebols contended that the 
Emission Trading Scheme would increase operations costs and cut into the company’s 
bottom line.52 As Heo explains, the government failed to “provide adequate financial and 
tax incentives to induce investments of market capital in green industries.”53 Ultimately, 
the government suspended the GG program, and relaxed regulations to meet the demands 
of the chaebols. 
While they were flexible when it came to the chaebols, the conservatives were not 
as flexible to the demands of civil society. The biggest complaint from the civil society 
opposition was the conservative’s unilateral approach in pushing the GG program. 
Therefore, because of this confrontation with civil society, it further provoked 
disagreements between the two sides. Furthermore, civil society aligned itself with the 
opposition which further complicated its ability to pass the policy. 
Similarly like Japan, South Korea has the support of the international community; 
it has a powerful ally in the United States; however, this alliance will not drastically 
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change depending upon who is in power. They both try to maintain good relationships 
with the U.S. While U.S. military base conflicts are at a minimum with conservatives in 
power, when progressives hold the majority in legislature and the presidential office, the 
situation becomes complicated. 
Unlike the conservatives, the progressive party holds a closer relationship with 
civil society groups. Members of the progressive party were individuals that fought the 
authoritarian party and were once members of civil society groups. Even though the 
progressives hold a close relationship with civil society groups, national security will take 
precedence over ideology. This was demonstrated during the anti-base movement 
involving the movement of the military base in Yong-san to Pyeongtaek. The Pan-South 
Korean Solution Committee Against Base Expansion in Pyeongtaek (KCPT) gained 
traction with some members of the progressive party who protested against the base 
relocation. The KCPT argued that “the entire base relocation process was conducted 
without the input of Daechuri residents, who were now being forcefully evicted.”54 Their 
concerns were represented in government by the Uri (ruling progressive party) and the 
Democratic Labor Party (DLP); however, they were a minority within the progressive 
party. As Yeo explains, “the handful of National Assembly members sympathetic to the 
KCPTs cause had very little power to persuade their fellow representatives on the 
Pyeongtaek issue.”55 President Roh Moo-hyun was in a dilemma in dealing with the anti-
base movement. He wanted to keep positive relations with the United States; however, he 
also did not want to suppress the KCPTs movement.56 In the end, the security of the 
country took precedence over ideology. As Yeo explains, “President Roh…recognized 
the potential for further deterioration in the alliance if the Korean government failed to 
fulfill its end of the bargain on base relocation.”57 The progressives accomplished this by 
turning their backs against the KCPT. The Ministry of National Defense labeled the 
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55 Ibid., 140. 
56 Ibid. 
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KCPT as outside forces who were forcing their own political agenda upon the residents 
of Daechuri.58 
While this section presents potential factors that may cause one-party dominance 
in South Korea, Chapter III of this thesis will give an in-depth analysis of the following 
factors: they are Pork barrel politics, fragmentation of the opposition, and control of the 
media. In analyzing the LDP of Japan, these factors can be seen as the most significant 
factors that enabled the party to establish dominance from 1955 to 1993. While this 
section will not get into the details of these factors, an in-depth analysis will be given in 
Chapter III. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is structured into three sections. The first section will examine the 
definition of one-party dominance. It will take into account the context in which one-
party dominance will examined and define the dimensions of one-party dominance. The 
second section will focus on what causes one-party dominance in a liberal democratic 
society by examining historical cases and finding commonalities of one-party dominance. 
The final section will focus on the conservative party of South Korea and if a one-party 
dominant system can be achieved by the conservatives. 
In defining one-party dominance in South Korea, Pempel describes four areas in 
which a party needs to hold to become a dominant party: dominance in number, 
bargaining position, chronology, and governmentally. Some of Pempel’s definitions of 
these four areas cannot be directly applied or there is a need for these definitions to be 
further clarified. Dominance in South Korea involves holding the presidency and a 
simple majority in the National Assembly for three consecutive terms. Additionally, a 
dominant party should hold a dominant position governmentally; however, it is not an 
absolute requirement to do so. 
In examining the causes of one-party dominance in South Korea, a comparative 
analysis will be done between the conservatives in South Korea and the LDP of Japan. 
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The LDP has been a dominant party in Japan from 1955 to 1993. During this period, 
scholars have identified three main factors that have caused the LDP to become a 
dominant party during this period: a deft use of pork barrel politics, opposition 
fragmentation that enabled the LDP to dominate government, and a close relationship 
with the media. When these factors are applied to South Korea, this thesis finds that no 
party holds an advantage in regard to pork barrel and the media; however, the progressive 
party is fragmented, which gives a weak advantage to the conservatives. An in-depth 
analysis of these factors will be provided in Chapter III. 
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II. DEFINING ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE—THEORY FOR 
SOUTH KOREA 
In a free democratic government, there is a struggle for power between multiple 
parties; however, this struggle for power can be generalized as taking place between the 
incumbents and their political opposition. The objective of the incumbent is to retain 
power and prevent challengers from dethroning them. The opposition’s objective is the 
inverse of the incumbents—it attempts to displace the incumbents by diverting support to 
itself. The political positions of each of these two entities are dependent upon their 
current standing. Incumbents, by virtue of their position, have an advantage over the 
opposition; they will remain in power unless they are removed from their position by the 
opposition. The challengers, by contrast, have the burden of reversing the advantages 
held by the incumbents in order to redirect votes to themselves that would have gone to 
the incumbents. The effort required is dependent upon incumbents’ strength. Ultimately, 
the political party that gains a majority of the votes takes control of the government. 
Since incumbents, by virtue of their position, have a structural advantage over the 
opposition, an inequality exists between the two parties; however, successful opposition 
parties mature and evolve with time. When this occurs, the opposition gradually grows in 
power, indicating that the incumbents are slowly losing their own. This rivalry between 
the incumbents and opposition often has three phases. In phase one, the incumbents are 
on the offensive while the opposition party is on the defensive; the opposition party is 
trying to stop the incumbents from increasing their power over the state even further. If 
an incumbent party is able to keep the opposition on the defensive for an extended period 
of time, it may be considered a dominant party. If the opposition is able to mount an 
offensive against the incumbents, both parties will reach a second phase, in which 
political conditions do not necessarily favor either party—that is, a competitive political 
system. At this stage, if the opposition is able to remove the advantages held by the 
incumbents and win, it forces the third phase: the transfer of power from incumbent to 
challengers. If the challengers are able to maintain that power for an extended period of 
time, they would then be considered the dominant party, and the parties’ roles would be 
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reversed; the previous incumbents would become the opposition, and the opposition will 
become the incumbents. 
With regard to one-party dominance, of main interest are the methods through 
which incumbents are able to keep the political system from moving beyond phase one. 
During all phases, competition between political parties may be fought in various 
dimensions, each of which may be considered one aspect of dominance. In his book 
Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes, T.J. Pempel holds that a 
party may be dominant in four dimensions: in number, in bargaining position, 
chronologically, and governmentally.59 While Pempel states that a party must generally 
be dominant in all four dimensions to be described as “dominant” overall, this thesis will 
argue that not all four characteristics are necessary for a party to be considered dominant. 
If a party is able to meet at a minimum three particular conditions out of these four—
dominance in number, in bargaining position, and chronologically—this should enable us 
to describe a party as dominant. Dominance governmentally is less an absolute 
requirement for a party to be seen as dominant than it is a likely by-product of dominance 
in the other three dimensions (and likely only possible in the first place given dominance 
in the other dimensions). 
A. DOMINANCE IN NUMBER 
Dominance in number can be interpreted most straightforwardly as majority 
control of a legislature. In the case of a presidency, this simply implies control of the 
presidency, since “majority control” would make no sense except in cases of multi-
person presidencies. This thesis argues that the presidency should take priority over the 
legislature in defining dominance, but that both branches must factor into the definition. 
First, winning the presidency is a more direct reflection of popular support. South Korea 
uses a simple popular vote to choose the president and so each individual has a direct 
impact on who is elected. Second, although Pempel argues that dominance in number 
should be signified by a majority of legislative seats, this argument is dependent upon the 
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assumption that a simple majority allows a political party to dominate the legislature.60 In 
the case of South Korea, a simple majority does not necessarily allow a political party to 
unilaterally pass bills against minority opposition. In 2012, the National Assembly 
Advancement Act was amended to limit the majority party from unilaterally passing bills 
through the National Assembly.61 A bill that is contested by the opposition can only 
move forward for vote if three-fifths of the National Assembly agrees to the bill. 
Furthermore, the National Assembly speaker can only unilaterally push an agenda during 
a natural disaster or war or via agreement with the opposition parties.62 The president 
does retain veto power, through which he or she can reject bills that are passed by the 
National Assembly. Therefore, the criteria for dominance depend on whether a party 
controls the presidency. If a party does control the presidency, it should also have a 
simple majority of the legislature to be considered dominant. If it does not control the 
presidency, it can be still considered dominant via control of two-thirds of the National 
Assembly. The structural logic behind these criteria will be explained in the next section, 
which discusses dominance in bargaining position. 
B. DOMINANT BARGAINING POSITION 
While the standard for unilateral legislative power is higher in the case of South 
Korea, this thesis argues that dominance in number can be achieved in several ways, 
depending upon whether a party controls the presidency. Furthermore, dominance in 
number should lead a party to gain a dominant bargaining position. Under the constraints 
of the National Assembly Advancement Act of 2012, and given, and the veto power held 
by the president, the possible combinations of dominance in number and bargaining 
dominance in South Korea are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 1.   Party Controls the Presidency 
 Type of majority in National Assembly 




(less than three-fifths) 
Does not hold 
simple majority 
Type of 
dominance Complete Complete Weak 
Weak to no 
dominance 
 
Table 2.   Opposition Controls the Presidency 
 Type of majority in National Assembly 




(less than three-fifths) 
Does not hold 
simple majority 
Type of 
dominance Strong No dominance No dominance No dominance 
 
1. Party Holding the Presidency 
If a given party controls the presidency, it should at a minimum hold a three-fifths 
majority in the National Assembly in order to establish complete dominance in both 
number and bargaining position over the opposition. This would allow the party to 
unilaterally push bills through the National Assembly and is the scenario that every party 
strives to achieve. 
If the president’s party were to only hold a simple majority over the opposition in 
the legislature, this would constitute a weakly dominant position. In South Korea, a 
simple majority in the National Assembly still requires a party to bargain with its 
opposition in order for bills to pass the legislature; it can no longer unilaterally pass bills 
without obstruction. One advantage that the majority party would still hold over the 
opposition in this scenario is the power of presidential veto. This would require greater 
compromise of the opposition, as bills that favor the opposition would most likely be 
vetoed by the president. This would be considered weak dominance. 
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Lastly, if the president’s party does not hold even a simple majority of the 
legislature, its degree of dominance would depend upon the opposition’s strength in the 
National Assembly. In this situation, even if the opposition were to control three-fifths of 
the National Assembly, the president’s party would still enjoy weak dominance over the 
opposition. If the opposition was able to unilaterally push bills through the National 
Assembly, the president’s party would still hold veto power and be able to force a 
compromise. If the opposition were to hold a two-thirds majority in the National 
Assembly, the president’s party would have no dominance; the non-presidential party 
would be considered to be dominant in number and bargaining position. According to the 
constitution of South Korea, Article 53, 
In case there is a request for reconsideration of a bill, the National 
Assembly reconsiders it, and if the National Assembly repasses the bill in 
the original form with the attendance of more than one half of the total 
members, and with a concurrent vote of two-thirds or more of the 
members present, it becomes law.63 
Once a political party holds two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, it gains 
the power to override presidential authority. At a minimum, the president’s party should 
meet the criteria of weak dominance, as defined here, to be considered a dominant party 
in South Korea. 
2. Dominance by a Non-presidential Party 
The inverse applies when the opposition holds the presidency. As explained 
earlier, in this scenario, the only possible way for a non-presidential party to be 
considered dominant is for it to hold a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly in 
order to override the veto power held by the presidency. Without control of the 
presidency, anything less than a two-thirds supermajority in the legislature would be 
considered not dominant. 
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3. Summary of Bargaining Power Requirements 
In analyzing the following scenarios, in South Korea there is an inherent 
advantage in holding the presidency; even without a majority in the National Assembly, 
the veto power of the presidency can force the opposition to compromise. 
In addition to this technical advantage, holding the presidency provides a major 
bargaining position over the opposition. The president has the ability to take unilateral 
actions granted under the South Korean constitution; he or she can take actions that do 
not need the approval of the National Assembly. As the chief representative of the 
country, the president has the ability to unilaterally conduct and agree to foreign treaties, 
declare war, and bypass the National Assembly in times of emergency. Article 76 of the 
Korean constitution defines emergency situations as a “time of internal turmoil, external 
menace, natural calamity, or a grave financial or economic crisis.”64 Furthermore, the 
president can appoint and dismiss public officers at his or her whim; he or she has the 
ability to appoint individuals to posts in a way that creates an advantage in implementing 
policies.65 The biggest advantage of the presidency is the ability to self-interpret these 
laws and execute policies as he or she sees fit. Furthermore, Article 84 protects the 
president from being charged with a crime unless he or she conducts an uprising or 
commits treason.66 This allows the president to take risks that might not be feasible for 
members of the National Assembly. Unless a two-thirds majority is reached in the 
National Assembly, the Assembly must consider the risk of a veto by the president. The 
President, on the other hand, has the ability to interpret law and execute those laws 
without the approval of the National Assembly. This gives the president an advantage. 
C. DOMINANCE CHRONOLOGICALLY 
The literature on one-party dominance includes multiple attempts to define 
dominance in chronology. Close examination of the literature shows that scholars take 
                                                 




varying approaches to this definition. Bogaards summarizes the definitions of 
chronological dominance provided by scholars, as shown in Table 3. 






























All definitions but Sartori’s are ambiguous; they do not provide a concrete 
timeframe over which a party’s control of government can be considered to make it a 
dominant party. Since these definitions are fluid and open to interpretation, this thesis 
will base chronological dominance on the definition provided by Sartori. 
Nwokora and Pelizzo summarize Sartori’s definition of chronological dominance: 
“when, for three successive elections, the potential for power alternation does not 
translate into actual alternation, a party system can no longer be treated as two-party and 
must be regarded as predominant.”68 One problem with Sartori’s definition is that he 
does not specifically explain why the minimum requirement should be three consecutive 
elections; he concentrates instead on the characteristics of parties that have won three 
consecutive elections. Nwokora and Pelizzo state that these properties are “(1) a 
unimodal power concentration; and (2) an absence of power alternation.”69 
Sartori states that a party able to win three consecutive elections must be 
considered a predominant party—and this thesis essentially agrees, arguing that 
chronological dominance should be used as one indicator of dominance. In examining 
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69 Ibid. 
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South Korea, three consecutive elections will be used a benchmark. Additionally, the 
properties behind chronological dominance as described by Sartori will be used to guide 
this thesis’ examination of whether the conservative party in South Korea seems headed 
toward chronological dominance. 
D. DOMINANCE GOVERNMENTALLY 
Pempel states that a governmentally dominant party will venture on a historical 
project, “a series of interrelated and mutually supportive public policies that give 
particular shape to the national political agenda.”70 A party that is dominant should be 
able to set an agenda for public policy. Furthermore, in a democracy, parties rely on the 
votes of public to stay in power. Therefore, the agenda set by the dominant party should 
also not interfere with its ability to sustain dominance; it should not lead them to lose 
dominance in government. Additionally, the agenda set by the dominant party should be 
durable, helping to legitimize the party’s dominance in government and enabling them to 
stay in power. While Pempel argues that a dominant party must display governmental 
dominance, this thesis argues that this is not an absolute requirement. In order for a party 
to achieve governmental dominance, the party must normally meet the prior three 
dominance criteria: dominance in number, dominance in bargaining position, and 
dominance chronologically. Furthermore, even if a party were to meet the first three 
requirements of dominance, it is the party’s choice as to whether to set the national 
agenda. While failing to do so would be a wasted opportunity, it does not, by definition, 
significantly impact the structural dominance that such a party would have already 
achieved. 
E. EXAMINING DOMINANCE IN SOUTH KOREA FROM 1988–2015 
1. The Importance of the Presidency in South Korea 
As noted previously, when examining a party’s ability to exert a dominant 
bargaining position, the assumption is usually made that with a simple majority in the 
legislature, a party should be able to effectively pass legislation on its own. The 
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implementation of South Korea’s National Assembly Advancement Act in 2012, though, 
has now empowered the opposition to have an effective voice in the National Assembly. 
In order for a law to be passed, unless the majority party holds a three-fifths 
supermajority in the National Assembly, a compromise with the opposition is required to 
pass laws. Since elections became democratic in 1987, no South Korean party has ever 
held a three-fifths majority. Currently, the conservative party is seeking to revise the 
National Assembly Advancement Act to eliminate these stringent majority requirements; 
the South Korean Constitutional Court is holding open hearings in regard to the 
legitimacy of the Advancement Act.71 It is unknown how the Constitutional Court will 
vote or if the two parties will compromise to eliminate these stringent majority 
requirements; a compromise seems highly unlikely, since the Assembly Act empowers 
the opposition and provides leverage against the conservatives. 
Currently in South Korea, the conservatives hold both the presidency and a simple 
majority in the National Assembly. While this constitutes a numerical advantage over the 
progressives, the system allows the smaller progressives to gain a stronger bargaining 
position. Evidence that supports this claim includes the frequency with which the Korean 
National Assembly passes bills in a timely manner. After current President Park assumed 
the presidency on February 25, 2013, the conservatives waited a full year before 
approved committee bills were brought forth to the plenary session for possible passage. 
In order for the 131 bills to be passed on February 28, 2014, President Park compromised 
with the opposition and agreed to establish a reform committee providing oversight over 
the Korean National Intelligence Service.72 This was due to the alleged misconduct of the 
National Intelligence Service for manipulating public opinion in the 2012 South Korean 
presidential election. Furthermore, the conservatives would need to compromise again on 
September 30, 2015, in order to pass 90 bills approved by lower committees.73 As part of 
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this compromise, though, the only major victory the progressives were able to gain was 
related to the Sewol Bill, which dictated formalities into how an investigation into the 
Sewol ferry sinking would proceed. 
The progressive parties’ stalling of legislative bills for close to a year suggests 
that as a result of the National Assembly Amendment Act of 2012, a party with a simple 
majority but not a supermajority in the National Assembly indeed cannot pass bills 
unilaterally. It would be simple, then, to conclude that no party is currently able to control 
a dominant bargaining position. However, there are disadvantages associated with 
stalling bills through the Amendment Act; there could be negative consequences for the 
stalling party. In the case of the progressives, when they swiftly forced the conservatives 
to compromise and passed legislative bills during February 2014, this was considered a 
win for the progressives; according to Gallup Korea, during this period progressive 
popularity rose from 15% to 28%.74 Furthermore, the progressives were able to draw 
independent voters to their party, gaining votes at the potential expense of the 
conservatives. But the period during which legislative bills were passed from February 
2014 through September 2015 also displayed how volatile it could be for the party to stall 
conservative progress in the National Assembly for an extended period of time. During 
that period, progressive gains started to recede while the popularity of the conservatives 
increased. By the end of the year, progressive support dropped to 22%, while the 
conservatives were able to increase theirs to 41%.75 
Of course, all bills must also be approved by the president. Therefore, this thesis 
argues that in South Korea, above all else, holding dominance over the presidency will 
lead to a dominant bargaining position. Although the National Assembly Advancement 
Act would require the president to compromise with the opposition to further their 
political agenda, the president still ultimately controls policymaking; this is important if 
the same party stays in controls for an extended period of time. It can be argued that in 
any presidential system, the president always has the authority to veto bills that do not fit 
                                                 





his or her overall political objectives. Most of the time, this advantage applies when the 
opposition tries to pass bills unilaterally in the National Assembly. Furthermore, if the 
same party holds a simple majority in the National Assembly and has control over the 
presidency, the majority party is more inclined to follow the wishes of the president and 
this weakens the bargaining position held by the minority. The reason for this expectation 
of governing party unity is the political clout held by the president over subordinate party 
members. Unless there is a valid reason provided by law, the president cannot forcefully 
remove individuals in the opposition party; however, the president does have more free 
and informal discretion to remove individuals within his or her own party. This gives 
power to the president to unilaterally push his or her agenda while maintaining political 
pressure to follow the president or face repercussions. 
Evidence of this was displayed in the conservative and progressive compromise 
on Civil Service Pension reforms on March 2015. Upon President Park’s request to 
reform civil service pensions on March 2015, the conservative party needed to 
compromise with the progressives to pass legislation; one of those compromises would 
come at a later date in September 2015, when the conservatives compromised on how to 
conduct the Sewol ferry investigation with the progressives. At the core of the 
compromise to pass the civil service pension reform was the insistence of the 
progressives to make changes to the National Assembly Act governing the administrative 
abilities of the President; the revision would allow the National Assembly to directly 
challenge the president on how laws were administered. As unlikely as it would normally 
be for this type of compromise to be generated by the conservatives in the National 
Assembly, they knew that some form of compromise would be necessary to pass any law. 
While the conservatives may have thought that this type of concession was necessary, 
their shortsightedness about their autonomy vis-à-vis their own president seemed evident 
from the events that followed. When both parties discussed changes to the National 
Assembly Act, President Park warned conservative party members that she would veto 
any bill that would change the National Assembly Act.76 In this scenario, the only path to 
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success for the conservatives would have been to defect to the progressives and create a 
two-thirds majority sufficient to override a presidential veto. However, the conservatives 
had no intention of overriding the president, which made their plan to compromise 
against the president’s wishes even more puzzling. In the end, conservative floor leader 
Yoo Seung-min stepped down months after the incident.77 
Historical data before the implementation of the National Assembly Amendment 
Act also shows similar patterns regarding the power of the presidency. The presidency of 
Roh Tae-woo (of the conservative Democratic Justice Party) illustrates what was possible 
with and without a simple majority in the National Assembly. Before the 1988 National 
Assembly elections, President Roh enjoyed a simple majority in the National Assembly 
(148 of 276 seats). Having control of both the National Assembly and the presidency, 
President Roh showed some inclination to compromise with the opposition parties; 
however, he used his numbers advantage to push laws unilaterally though the National 
Assembly. Shortly after taking office, major political parties sought to amend the 
National Assembly election law; however, they could not compromise on the number of 
electoral districts. The ruling conservative party and the conservative minor party (New 
Democratic Republican) led by Kim Jong-pil favored a multi-district system, while the 
opposition, led by Kim Young-sam (Reunification Democratic) and Kim Dae-jung 
(Peace and Democracy), favored a single member district system.78 Even after President 
Roh compromised with the opposition toward a single member district system, minor 
disagreements stalled a joint bill’s being passed. Instead of coming to an agreement with 
the opposition party, President Roh used his advantage in the National Assembly and 
unilaterally pushed through the revised election law.79 Although President Roh was 
willing to compromise, he used his advantage when needed. 
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When his party lost its majority in the 1988 National Assembly elections, holding 
the presidency limited the extent of what the opposition could do in the National 
Assembly. In that election, the Democratic Justice Party lost its majority in winning only 
125 of 299 seats in the National Assembly. While the DJP was the largest party in the 
National Assembly, the opposition parties formed an alliance that enabled them to force 
compromises upon the president. During this period, the opposition was able to obtain the 
release of political prisoners and reform the judiciary branch to make it more independent 
from executive influence.80 While the progressives were able to further democratize the 
central government, its attempted expansion of powers of the National Assembly—an 
attempt to expand legislative powers by having the ability to order judicial warrants to 
testify before the National Assembly—was met with resistance from President Roh.81 
After having their bills vetoed, the opposition was forced to compromise and instead held 
hearings into investigations. In 1989, while Roh did not have a majority in the National 
Assembly, he displayed why holding the presidency alone is of paramount importance in 
South Korea. 
If 1988 in South Korea could be summarized as a year of liberalization of the 
government by the opposition, 1989 could be summarized as a year of reversion of 
policies set forth by the progressive parties. During this period, President Roh used 
societal pressures to justify his reversal policies set forth by the progressives. In 1989, 
South Korea was marred in protests; farmers were rioting against the government’s 
liberalization of agriculture trade.82 A left-leaning protest group, the National Association 
of University Student Councils, was challenging government policies against North 
Korea. There was a nationwide labor strike against Hyundai, and students waged violent 
protest against the police, taking the lives of seven police officers. In 1988, the opposition 
curbed the power of the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP). Their reason 
was the agency’s human rights violations amid investigations. Furthermore, the 
opposition limited domestic operations conducted by the agency and made classified 
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information available to the public for transparency purposes. As the crisis escalated, 
opposition policies against the Agency for National Security Planning were reversed. 
Under the guise of the National Security Act, the president authorized the ANSP to 
conduct investigations into journalists with antigovernment sentiments, arresting 
individuals who visited North Korea without authorization, breaking into opposition 
headquarters during by-elections, and banning printed materials that were anti-
government in nature. Furthermore, cabinet members were reshuffled, with President 
Roh appointing a prosecutor who had worked under the authoritarian regime to lead the 
ANSP. The National Assembly’s attempts to curb the power of the ANSP were stopped 
indefinitely, with the government strengthening the power of the ANSP by creating an 
amendment that allowed it to bypass constitutional law to investigate matters under the 
National Security Act. 
If the conservative party is able to go beyond this and achieve the three structural 
dimensions of one-party dominance, it should in turn become dominant governmentally 
and set the national policy agenda. Since the democratization of South Korea, no party 
has achieved the three main structural criteria of one-party dominance. If the 
conservatives are able to become dominant, their ability to set the national policy agenda 
should be similar to what President Park Chung-hee was able to achieve during his 
authoritarian government, albeit without control over society as under authoritarian rule. 
Chapter III will explore whether the conservative party is indeed in a position to 
achieve this. 
2. Technical Analysis of Dominance in South Korea 
Based on the definitions provided earlier, Tables 4 through 6 summarize the 
history and current status of dominance for South Korean political parties. 
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Table 4.   Numerical, Bargaining and Chronological Dominance of Parties in 
South Korea—Presidency 
Year Party holding presidency # of consecutive presidential wins by party 
1988 Roh Tae-woo (Conservative) N/A 
1993 Kim Young-sam (Conservative) 2 
1998 Kim Dae-jung (Progressive) N/A 
2003 Roh Moo-hyun (Progressive) 2 
2008 Lee Myung-bak (Conservative) N/A 
2012 Park Geun-hye (Conservative) 2 
Table 5.   Numerical, Bargaining and Chronological Dominance of Parties in 
South Korea—National Assembly 
Year Party holding simple majority in National Assembly 
# of consecutive holds in 
National Assembly 
1988 None N/A 
1992 None N/A 
1996 None N/A 
2000 Conservative (Simple) N/A 
2004 Progressive (Simple) N/A 




Table 6.   Types of Dominance held by Political Parties in South Korea 
Year Party holding presidency 
Number/bargaining 
position Chronological 
1988 Conservative Weak None 
1993 Conservative Weak None 
1998 Progressive Weak None 
2003 Progressive Complete None 
2008 Conservative Complete None 
2012 Conservative Weak None 
 
Ever since South Korea implemented a democratic voting system in 1987, no 
party has displayed chronological dominance; however, the conservative party has held 
the presidency for a longer period of time than its progressive counterparts. Under 
authoritarian rule, the conservative party controlled both the presidency and National 
Assembly for 25 years, from 1963 to 1988. Even after the democratization of South 
Korean, the conservative party continued to control the presidency for ten more years, 
until 1998–2008, when they were defeated by the progressives. Starting in 2008, the 
conservatives have again currently won two consecutive elections, giving them the 
presidency until at least 2018. 
The same trend appears for the National Assembly. From 1988 to 1996, no single 
party was able to capture a simple majority (150 of 299 seats) in the National Assembly; 
only through mergers or alliances were parties able to capture a majority. In the 1988 
National Assembly elections, the conservatives were able to capture a plurality but not a 
simple majority in the National Assembly: 125 of 299 seats. Two years later, they did 
capture the majority by merging with minor parties (the Reunification Democratic Party 
[RDP] and the New Democratic Republican Party [NDRP]), which gave them 219 of 299 
seats. In the 1992 National Assembly elections, the conservative party would lose its 
simple majority by one seat (149 out of 299 seats). One could claim that the opposition 
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was close to claiming dominance in the National Assembly by virtue of its majority in 
two consecutive elections; however, this was achieved through a coalition between 
separate parties. There was no single opposition party that held a majority in the National 
Assembly. 
In 2000, the conservative party held a simple majority and then the progressives 
held the same advantage during the 2004 elections. In the 2008 and 2012 elections, the 
conservatives became the first political party to have won two consecutive majorities in 
the National Assembly. 
By Sartori’s definition of chronological dominance, no party has shown 
chronological dominance in South Korea since democratization. However, the 
conservative party is in position to become a chronologically dominant party. As 
previously mentioned, with two consecutive wins already in the National Assembly 
(simple majority) and the presidency, the 2016 National Assembly and especially the 
2017 Presidential elections will determine if they will become a dominant party. While 
Sartori’s definition of chronological dominance is arbitrary, it still serves as a useful 
benchmark. And data since the last presidential election suggest favorable conditions for 
the conservatives to achieve this. 
Since the last South Korean presidential election held in 2012, the conservatives 
in South Korea have solidified their position as the preferred party. According to a poll 
conducted by Gallup Korea (December 2015), 42% of respondents preferred the 
conservative party.83 Compared to the conservatives, 22% of respondents were found to 
be in favor of the progressive party; this is a significant increase compared to polls that 
were conducted in November 2012.84 During that period, according to the same polls 
conducted by Gallup Korea, conservative support was at 36%, with progressive support 
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at 32%.85 Independents stayed roughly the same as in December 2015: 31% identified 
themselves as independents. This is similar to the 28% of individuals who identified 
themselves as independents in November 2012.86 
Between 2012 and 2015, then, the conservative party increased its support by 6%, 
while progressive party support decreased by 10%. With independents staying roughly 
the same, these numbers suggest that the conservatives were able to sway voters who 
supported the progressive party. With December 2015 polls indicating the conservative 
party having a 20% advantage over their opponents, it would be straightforward to 
conclude that they have a numbers advantage. If elections were held today, the 
progressives would theoretically need to win about 93.5% of independent voters to 
overtake the conservative party in South Korea. While the 2012 South Korean 
presidential election was a close contest between Park Geun-hye (51.6% of votes) and 
Moon Jae-in (48% of votes), the progressives were unable to overcome the 5% advantage 
held by the conservatives. The two parties split independent votes evenly with the 
conservatives taking 48% share compared to the progressives who took 51%.87 
Chapter III will explore what specific advantages the conservative party holds 
over the progressives—and, in turn, whether the conservatives should be able to carry 
this advantage over to the next elections and thereby achieve dominance by this thesis’ 
definition (or, at least, approach dominant status by most any chronological definition). 
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III. EXAMINING CAUSES OF ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE 
This chapter will conduct a comparative analysis of a one-party dominant state, 
Japan, and South Korea. It will compare the factors that enabled Japan to become a state 
dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party and analyze whether similar conditions exist 
in South Korea. Other one-party dominant states could have been used as a comparison, 
such as the African National Congress in South Africa (in power since 1996) or the 
Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (in power since 1982); however, the political 
structure of South Korea has been influenced to some extent by the Japanese political 
model.88 While Japan’s factors might not apply completely to South Korea, Japan 
provides a good starting point for analysis. Although numerous factors may contribute to 
one-party dominance, this thesis will focus on three major ones in the LDP’s case: pork 
barrel, opposition fragmentation and bureaucracy, and control of the media. First, though, 
this chapter will explore why we should consider a one-party dominant system possible 
in South Korea in the first place. 
A. POSSIBILITY OF ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE IN SOUTH KOREA 
In examining the conservatives in South Korea, some scholars argue that they 
cannot be considered a legitimate party. One factors pointed to is that politics in South 
Korea are not well institutionalized; there is a lack of stability in parties. The Oxford 
Dictionary defines institutionalization as “the action of establishing something as a 
convention or norm in an organization or culture.”89 In analyzing the institutionalization 
of South Korea, many scholars use Mainwaring’s four indicators of party system 
institutionalization: “(1) the stability of patterns of electoral competition, (2) the strength 
of party roots in society, (3) the legitimacy of parties, and (4) the structuring of party 
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organization.”90 Kim, using these four indicators summarizes the party system 
institutionalization of South Korea as shown in Table 7. 
Table 7.   Party System Institutionalization in South Korea According to 
Mainwaring91 
Dimension South Korea 
Patterns of inter-party competition Volatile 
Parties social roots Regionalism 
Legitimacy to party Weak 
Party-leader relationship Subordinate 
 
This section will mainly focus on Mainwaring’s first and third indicators, as our 
main focus is political parties. While Kim indicates that inter-party competition is volatile 
and party legitimacy is weak, he does not explain how those conclusions were made. This 
section pursues this in more detail. 
First, scholars indicate that the volatile nature of inter-party competition is due to 
how South Korean political parties are organized internally: their hierarchical structure is 
the root cause of volatility. While South Korea has adopted modern democracy, it still 
infuses traditional values of Confucianism into politics. Kim and Park summarize 
Confucian values in South Korea as “respect for authority and elders, loyalty, and the 
importance of education and diligence, which are traditional values aimed at maintaining 
social order, harmony in the family.”92 Perhaps as a result in South Korea, political 
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parties revolve around the leader instead of the party; the political party leader enjoys an 
enormous amount of power and the party exists to serve the leader.93 One consequence of 
this leader-centric structure is that no party mechanism exists to elect the next party 
leader. In turn, factions develop within the party surrounding those who position 
themselves to lead the party and parties themselves sometimes change names and 
organizational structures upon leadership changes. This is thought to hinder South 
Korea’s development of well-institutionalized—and perhaps even legitimate—political 
parties. 
Steinberg holds that “in Korea, parties are little more than symbols around which 
candidates can rally their supporters. They remain the weakest link in the democratic 
process…”94 This type of behavior by political parties can also be considered the genesis 
of party system weakness in South Korea. One reflection of poor party system 
institutionalization in South Korea is that a majority of the population does not affiliate 
themselves with a political party. Tan et al. finds that South Korea’s progressives and 
conservatives are not polarized as often thought. Data from the 1997 presidential election 
shows that nearly half of all individuals polled indicated a political affiliation while the 
other half considered themselves independents; this closely mirrors data collected by 
Gallup Korea.95 During the 2012 Presidential elections, polls showed patterns close to 
those provided by Tan et al., with about 44% of the population affiliating themselves with 
a political party and the rest considering themselves independents.96 An explanation of 
this outcome seems related to the leadership centric politics of South Korea. Since 
political leaders use the party as their personal platform for election, as stated by 
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Steinberg, political leaders often implement policies that are not consistent with their 
party’s paradigms. President Kim Young-sam, a leader of the opposition to the 
conservative party, later joined the conservative party and acted against his paradigm of 
reform by putting down labor unrest during his presidency. President Roh Moo-hyun of 
the progressive party enabled anti-American sentiments during his presidency, but 
contrary to his original political views initiated a free trade agreement with the United 
States. Given this, voters in South Korea likely base their vote on the individual and not 
the party. 
While this thesis does not contest the findings of the abovementioned literature, it 
still contends that an analysis of a one-party dominant democracy is possible in South 
Korea. While scholars define South Korea as having weak parties due to their un-
institutionalized nature, Mainwaring provides a counterpoint, stating that 
“institutionalization need not rest on any specific kind of party; it can occur in systems 
with comparatively loose parties.”97 “Although weak institutionalization is typically 
associated with a variety of problems…an institutionalized party system is hardly a 
panacea.”98 In South Korea, while political party names change and the behavior of 
leaders sometimes run contrary to the stated ideals of their political parties, the general 
philosophy of conservatism or progressivism is carried from one political leader to the 
next. Since South Korea’s democratization in 1987, the conservatives have changed the 
name of their party five times, but while a change in party names might indicate the 
creation of a new conservative party, this has not been the case. In South Korea, changing 
of party names is a political tactic used by conservatives and progressives to shed a 
negative image associated with the previous political party leader; the main members of 
the political party do not change. Rather, this tactic involves a continuation of the 
previous party—relabeled to give the impression that a new party has been created. The 
history of the conservative party also shows that even when names have changed, voters 
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have carried over to the new political party.99 Therefore, in South Korea, instead of 
narrowly focusing on the potential dominance of a particular conservative party, it is 
more appropriate to take a broader approach and analyze whether “the conservative 
party” might become dominant. 
B. PORK BARREL POLITICS 
1. Japan 
One method dominant parties use to influence the population and obtain votes is 
pork barrel politics. In Japan, pork barrel spending can be considered a core component 
of politics for the dominant LDP. Fukui and Fukai explain that “Japanese voters are 
mobilized at election time mainly by the lure of pork barrel, only marginally by policy 
issues...”100 Japanese politics is heavily influenced by clientelistic privileges; districts are 
heavily dependent upon the central government for funding. Therefore, districts are more 
inclined to vote for incumbent members to keep the flow of funds going through their 
regions. Furthermore, as members of the dominant party, LDP legislators are able to 
garner votes in their region by pulling pork into the region, which incentivizes citizens to 
vote for the party. The opposition, meanwhile, lacks connections with the bureaucracy 
that would bring pork to their perspective regions. Unlike policy positions, these cannot 
be developed while in opposition. 
2. South Korea 
a. Pork Barrel and Votes 
In South Korea, the party that controls the presidency has an advantage over their 
political opponents when it comes to the use of pork barrel to influence politics. 
According to Article 54 of the South Korean Constitution, it gives the president power to 
create the fiscal budget which is then reviewed by the National Assembly for approval.101 
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If any new expenditures or changes to the budget are deemed necessary by the National 
Assembly under Article 57, those changes must be approved by the President.102 This 
gives great power to the president regarding how those funds are distributed. From a 
macro level, according to Kwon, subsidy distribution by the central government was 
distributed to swing-vote regions.103 While Kwon provides statistical evidence that 
government subsidies favor swing regions compared to core regions, though, the study 
fails to specifically mention how those funds target specific sectors to direct votes to the 
party. 
Horiuchi and Lee attempt to fill in this missing distribution information. Their 
data compare vote shares to pork barrel distribution by region. Their independent 
variables include voters’ occupation and age and their districts’ population density and 
metropolitan character. As with Kwon’s study, while Horiuchi and Lee’s data show 
connections between pork barrel and voting in a region, they still do not answer how 
those funds are distributed and which sectors of the population those funds target, which 
would in turn translate into how individuals choose to vote. Kwon does acknowledge that 
information that might provide a more solid causal link between subsidies and voting is 
not available due, since data on distribution of subsidies were not available for 
analysis.104 While specific subsidy distribution data were not available, analysis of the 
number of public projects in the area was. 
Kim and Lee state that “a politician’s local public good provision such as large-
scale public projects funded by the central government has positive impact on his 
reelection.”105 This suggests that decentralized funding from the central government is 
not intended to positively impact presidential elections; its purpose seems to be to assist 
regional politicians for reelection. This seems plausible, as there is a negative popular 
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connotation to the central government’s influencing the population to garner votes. This 
is most likely due to the degree of clientelism that was prevalent before the 
democratization of South Korea. During the authoritarian rule of president Park Chung-
hee, a close relationship existed between the state and business conglomerates (chaebol). 
The state directly developed the conglomerates, who in return provided support to the 
state, thus bringing legitimacy to the authoritarian government. As these practices 
became the norm, clientelistic behavior continued to be prevalent after democratization. 
In order for chaebols to keep the benefits that were provided by the government, they 
were required to provide contributions to the current regime. If they did not contribute to 
the government, they would see sudden law changes that would make it difficult for them 
to continue their business. Through this method, President Roh Tae-woo accumulated a 
$650 million slush fund from contributions that he received from the conglomerates.106 
Former President Kim Yong-sam, who initiated reforms to corruption, was also found to 
have violated campaign rules and future Korean President Kim Dae-jung admitted to 
taking monetary donations from then President Roh Tae-woo.107 Therefore, because of 
the negative image associated with smaller-scale pork barrel politics by previous 
administrations, instead of targeting a specific group with pork barrel, presidents initiate 
large scale projects that that target regions. 
During his term in office, President Roh Moo-hyun initiated a plan to build an 
expressway that connected Seoul to Sejong City to cut down on commuting times to the 
capital; this is a region of South Korea that is highly contested by both parties during 
elections. This project continued as the Lee Myung-bak administration funded the 
project, with current President Park Geun-hye finally executing the construction. 
Furthermore, President Roh Moo-hyun attempted to move the capital to Sejong City, but 
that plan was deemed unconstitutional by the Korean Supreme Court. The targeting of 
swing regions and the continuation of projects into the region seems to verify that pork 
barrel is being concentrated into contested regions, as stated by Kwon. That said, it is 
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difficult to directly link pork barrel spending to positive results that enable a party to 
obtain a simple majority in the National Assembly. 
Regardless of how pork barrel politics affects voting in South Korea, these 
findings support the idea that pork barrel is not an advantage that is strictly held by the 
conservative party. In Japan, it is evident that pork barrel spending is able to keep the 
LDP in power; in South Korea, that advantage is used by both parties. Woo mentions two 
methods in which pork barrel is distributed to regions: through local allocation taxes and 
national subsidies.108 The use of local allocation taxes as pork barrel is ruled out, as their 
distribution is set by law and cannot be easily manipulated. National subsidies are more 
discretionary, allowing manipulation by the central government. Therefore, when the 
central government and the National Assembly discuss the distribution of national 
subsidies, local governments spend a significant amount of time trying to obtain those 
subsidies, which suggests that national subsidies are used in pork barrel politics.109 In 
tracking the amount of national subsidies from 1989–2008, Woo found that during non-
election periods, national subsidies were targeted toward regions that were core 
supporters of the incumbent party; during election periods, the central government 
diverted national subsidies to swing regions.110 Overall, even with the fluctuation of 
subsidy distribution before and after elections, Woo found that core supporters received 
more subsidies compared to swing supporters.111 These findings suggest that the 
conservatives and progressives equally use national subsidies to influence the outcome of 
legislative and presidential elections, reinforcing the idea that no party holds an 
advantage in pork barrel in South Korea. 
In South Korea, it is difficult to prove that pork barrel has a significant effect in 
generating votes for the conservative party. While studies conducted by Horiuchi, S. Lee, 
Kim, H. Lee, and Woo display that parties target swing and core regions with national 
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subsidies, there is no data to link pork barrel to increased votes for the incumbent party. 
Although Tables 8 and 9 might be seen to suggest that national subsidies into swing 
regions netted a positive result for the president’s party in obtaining more seats in the 
National Assembly; however, this conclusion would be a leap of interpretation, as there 
are other factors that may have contributed to a region’s voting a specific way. 
Table 8.   Combined Total Number of Seats Captured in Swing Regions by Party 
(Seoul, Gyeonggi, and Chungcheong Provinces)112 
Year / party in control of 
presidency Conservative Progressive 
1992 / Conservative 47* 35 
1996 / Conservative 48* 28 
2000 / Progressive 38 56* 
2004 / Progressive 31 80* 
2008 / Conservative 73* 31 
2012 / Conservative 46 65* 
  
                                                 




Table 9.   Historical Data of Votes Won by Party in Swing Regions113 
 Region 
Year Party Seoul Gyeonggi Chungcheong 
1992 
 
Conservative 16* 18* 13* 
Progressive 25 8 2 
1996 
 
Conservative 27* 18* 3* 
Progressive 18 10 0 
2000 
 
Conservative 17 18 3 
Progressive 28* 22* 6* 
2004 
 
Conservative 16 14 1 
Progressive 32* 35* 13* 
2008 
 
Conservatives 40* 32* 1 
Progressives 7 17 7* 
2012 
 
Conservatives 16 21 9* 
Progressives 30* 29* 6 
 
These factors could include the amount of younger voters vs. older voters that 
showed up to the poll: younger voters tend to vote for the progressives while older voters 
vote conservative. Other factors could include stances on economic, foreign affairs, and 
other national policy agendas that may have encouraged voters to vote a specific way. In 
trying to link pork barrel to voting behavior in South Korea, there emerges no conclusive 
evidence that pork barrel spending has a significant impact on votes for the incumbent 
party. 
                                                 




b. Efficient Use of Pork Barrel 
Evidence suggests that no party holds an advantage over the other in using pork 
barrel in South Korea—both parties use pork equally to further their political agenda—
although society’s general perception is that pork is at times more beneficial for the 
conservative party. This is most likely due to the environment the conservative party 
created during the authoritarian regime, in which they set the precedent on the 
distribution of pork in the country. As the party that spearheaded the economic miracle 
from 1965–1980, the conservatives solidified pork barrel distribution practices that 
continue to this day. Under the conservative authoritarian regime and developmental state 
model, the conservatives used pork barrel to further their industrial goals. President Park 
was able to monopolize power and enforce enduring economic policies that were 
necessary for South Korea to grow; he legitimized his rule with results.114 One method 
was the distribution of de facto pork barrel not only to citizens or regions, but also to the 
conglomerates themselves. Park’s economic policies allowed only one method through 
which companies could obtain loans. This allowed the government to dictate how those 
loans would be used by businesses; it kept companies in check and forced them to 
comply with government inputs to receive government support and incentives.115 
Johnson explains that in Korea, “80% of funds were obtained by the government banking 
system while 20% came from internal equity.”116 The purpose of heavy internal 
financing was to control private firms by offering incentives in executing economic 
policies.117 When companies did not benefit from economic policy, the government had 
the ability to manipulate and underwrite loans, which helped business to operate despite 
losses.118 Through this process, under the authoritarian regime, the conglomerates 
became central to the growth of the South Korean economy. While some may question 
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how subsidiary funding for conglomerates has an impact on voting in South Korea, this 
thesis argues that pork distribution to the conglomerates matter. 
During the presidency of Kim Dae-jung, the progressives decided to move away 
from a hardline policy toward North Korea and transition to a softer, “Sunshine” Policy. 
The main idea behind the Sunshine Policy was to soften North Koreas stance toward the 
South through economic assistance and interaction. Although President Kim pledged to 
“root out political corruption by severing close ties between the big business and the 
government,” the system required him to use conglomerates to further his political 
agenda.119 To successfully implement the Sunshine Policy, President Kim pragmatically 
and secretly worked with Hyundai to provide financial aid to North Korea, leading to 
what would become known as the cash-for-summit scandal. Korean prosecutors found 
that a total of $500 million was sent to North Korea via Hyundai subsidiary groups.120 In 
return for its cooperation, Hyundai was promised rights to the tourism project in Mt. 
Kumgang and development of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea. When 
President Kim admitted to the financing of $500 million that may have led to the Inter-
Korean summit in 2000, his reputation and the credibility of the Sunshine Policy were 
undermined.121 When the conservatives tried the opposite approach in not providing pork 
to the conglomerates, it became difficult to further their political agenda—for example, 
President Lee Myung-bak’s Green Growth Policy, noted in Chapter I.122 
Although pork is used (or misused) similarly by both political parties, the 
perception that the conservatives better manage the economy does help them during 
elections. During the 2007 presidential elections, Lee Myung-bak was largely elected 
based on the perception of his being able to stimulate the economy. Past progressive 
voters turned to President Lee, stating, for example, that “I’ve always voted for liberals, 
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but this time the economy became such a huge issue.”123 Although Lee’s Green Growth 
policy to simulate the economy was a failure, overall he continued to spread pork to the 
conglomerates in the name of economic competitiveness. According to the National 
Assembly Budget Office, in 2012 the conservatives spent a total of $673.9 million in 
direct pork subsidies to conglomerates.124 According to Samsung, these pork subsidies 
enable them to stay competitive against the world market.125 With the top 10 
conglomerates making up 76% of South Korean GDP, and with continued support for the 
conglomerates, this perception will continue to draw votes for the conservative’s party 
when the economy is the forefront of elections.126 
C. FRAGMENTATION OF OPPOSITION 
1. Japan 
Another enabler of Liberal Democratic Party dominance in Japan has been the 
fragmentation of the opposition. During the initial stages of dominance by the LDP 
during the 1950s, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) was the main opposition party in Japan. 
During this period, the LDP enjoyed a two-to-one vote advantage over the main 
opposition; as time progressed, the JSP would see defections that would create a multi-
party system in Japan. Before the elections of 1960, right wing members of the JSP 
defected to form the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). Furthermore, during the 1970s, 
Japan would see the creation of the Buddhist Clean Government Party (CGP) and Japan 
Communist Party (JCP). Before the creation of multiple opposition parties in Japan, 
during the 1958 elections, the JSP had captured 92% of the opposition vote; however, 
after the creation of multiple opposition parties, by 1976, their share of the opposition 
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votes was reduced to 44%.127 Furthermore, amid this fragmentation the opposition 
essentially competed among themselves, splitting the number of legislative seats 
available. During the 1969 elections, the LDP was only able to obtain 48% of the votes; 
however, they were able to win 59% of the seats.128 Therefore, the fragmentation of the 
opposition can be identified as contributing to LDP dominance in government. 
2. South Korea 
Similar to the LDP opposition in Japan, the conservatives’ opponents in South 
Korea seem to be fragmented; however, fragmentation has similarly caused the 
conservative party to lose presidential elections. In this section we will specifically analyze 
two presidential elections, between which fragmentation has affected both parties. 
a. South Korean Presidential Election of 1987 
Similar to Japan, democratic South Korea started as a two-party system that 
eventually evolved into a multi-party system. The authoritarian government continued its 
presence in democracy through the Democratic Justice Party, while the main opposition 
party was the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP). Within the NKDP, there were two 
prominent leaders who would eventually take the presidency in Kim Young-sam and Kim 
Dae-jung; while the NKDP was led by Lee Min-woo, the two Kims held significant 
influence within the party.129 Initially when Lee tried to compromise with the DJP in 
forming a parliamentary government in exchange for democratic government reforms, 
this was met with resistance within from the two Kims. Eventually, the two Kims would 
split, forming their own parties and fragmenting the opposition even further. Kim Young-
sam formed the Reunification Democratic Party, taking 66 out of 90 NKDP members to 
his party.130 Initially Kim Dae-jung joined the RDP as an advisor; however, a power 
struggle would ensue between the two Kims. 
                                                 
127 Kurt Steiner, Ellis S. Krauss, and Scott C. Flanagan, Political Opposition and Local Politics in 
Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1980), 46. 
128 Ibid., 47. 
129 Han Sung-joo, “South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization,” Asian Survey 28, no. 1 
(January 1988): 53, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644872. 
130 Ibid., 53. 
 51
Before the 1987 South Korean presidential elections, the two Kims could not 
settle on which individual should run as president; both Kims saw themselves as heroes 
of democracy and refused to back down.131 Kim Young-sam saw himself as appealing to 
a broad range of voters and as having the ability to unite the nation under the party. On 
the other hand, Kim Dae-jung saw himself as an embodiment of political activism who 
suffered under the authoritarian regime for the sake of democracy, and therefore as 
representing the population who similarly suffered under the authoritarian regime.132 
After trying to compromise with one another to settle on a single candidate, the two 
ultimately ran against each other during the 1987 presidential elections; their failure to 
compromise would be their downfall. Roh Tae-woo of the Democratic Justice Party 
received 36.6% of the votes, while Kim Young-sam (28%) and Kim Dae-jung (27%) 
together received 55% of the votes, but neither received as many as Roh.133 If the 
opposition had compromised before the 1987 election, it is highly likely that they would 
have been able to defeat the conservatives. 
b. South Korean Presidential Election of 1997 
The conservatives would face the same consequences of fragmentation during the 
1997 presidential elections. The DJP had settled on Kim Dae-jung as the candidate who 
would represent them. For the conservatives, the nomination was complicated by internal 
politics that would eventually fragment the party. Compared to previous administrations, 
during which a successor was selected within the party, an open election was held between 
conservative candidates. After narrowing down the candidates from nine, the two 
candidates remaining for the conservative party were Lee Hoi-chang and Lee In-je; Lee 
Hoi-chang would win the runoff election, making him the New Korea Party (NKP) 
nominee.134 Lee Hoi-chang’s nomination was problematic in that he was an outsider to 
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individuals who were loyal to President Kim Young-sam.135 Furthermore, during this 
period, polls also suggested that Lee Hoi-chang was trailing behind Kim Dae-jung and Lee 
In-je for the presidency.136 Therefore, Lee In-je could not accept the nomination of Lee 
Hoi-chang as the NKP nominee and left the party to form his own party called the New 
People Party (NPP).137 This was problematic for Lee Hoi-chang, as Lee In-je not only took 
party loyalists with him, but also split the conservative vote between the two parties. Kim 
Dae-jung would win the 1997 election, capturing 40.3% of the votes, while the 
conservatives captured 57.9% of the votes; Lee Hoi-chang received 38.7% of the votes 
while Lee In-je captured 19.2% of the votes.138 If the conservatives were able to 
compromise on a single candidate, it would have most likely given them the presidential 
election of 1997. 
c. The Ahn Chul-soo Effect—Opposition Fragmentation 
Examining the conservative and progressives from the 2012 presidential elections 
suggests that fragmentation will continue to be a problem for the progressives, which will 
strengthen the conservative party. The current fragmentation of the progressive party 
seems similar to that of the presidential election of 1987. Furthermore, the progressives 
seem to be in a state of disarray, with an outsider having managed to fragment the party. 
This is unusual; since democratization, when fragmentations occurred, they occurred 
among insiders within the parties. This was mainly due to the insulated nature of politics 
within South Korea, which made it difficult for outsiders to bring about change in an 
established party. During the 2012 South Korean presidential elections, though, Ahn 
Chul-soo challenged that perception; currently he has managed to challenge and fragment 
the institutionalized nature of the progressive party. 
Ahn is not a career politician. He started his career as a medical doctor and 
transitioned into business, creating AhnLab in 1995, which gave him fame for providing 
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free antivirus software to individuals in South Korea. Through his success with AhnLab 
and books on computers, he enjoyed rising popularity with young individuals. When Ahn 
contemplated running for the 2011 Seoul mayoral race, many young voters supported the 
idea of his running against the Grand National Party as an independent.139 In the end, he 
stepped aside in favor of independent Park Won-soon. 
Ahn would reappear during the 2012 South Korean presidential race. Ahn ran as 
an independent against Park Guen-hye and Moon Jae-in; however, he fragmented the 
progressive vote, which undermined Moon’s chances of defeating Park. Ahn’s popularity 
within the progressive base was due to the perception that he was not a career politician 
and could bring about change within the political scene.140 According to polls taken in 
October 2012, Ahn’s lead against Moon varied from 2 to 10%, and he remained even 
with conservative party candidate Park.141 When elections headed toward November, 
Ahn could not overcome the progressive establishment, as Moon began to lead Ahn at the 
polls by 2 to 9%.142 Furthermore, as elections drew closer in December, Ahn’s lack of 
governmental experience started to hurt him. Although the main progressive party was 
able to take the lead, it was still splitting the progressive vote with Ahn, which would 
assure a victory for conservative candidate Park; in the end, Ahn conceded to Moon. 
Although Ahn stated publicly that this move was made in order to defeat the conservative 
party, it was in fact, a political move to establish himself within the progressive party. 
Two years after the 2012 presidential elections, Moon would join forces with Ahn again 
to create a new progressive party, the New Politics Alliance for Democracy. This alliance 
would be short, though, as Ahn would leave the NPAD on December 2015, which 
initiated the current pattern of progressive fragmentation. 
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When Ahn merged with Moon to create the NPAD, he co-chaired the party with a 
former progressive presidential candidate Kim Han-gill. Some viewed Ahn’s ability as an 
outsider to co-chair the NPAD as connected to a change in the candidate nomination 
process. Like the NPAD, the conservatives were also in the process of revising party 
nominations for elections toward a more open process; however, they reversed their 
decision and decided to stick to their traditional methods. In ultimately retaining party- 
chosen candidates for particular regions, the conservatives maintained an advantage in 
putting forth individuals that appealed to these regions. Given this conservative 
advantage in the candidacy process, the progressives would also reverse themselves and 
stuck to the traditional method of party leaders’ choosing candidates. Due to this back-
and-forth process of reform, the NPAD started to lose members. In response to the 
conservative party, Ahn ultimately chose individuals who were close to him for the 2014 
by-elections, which resulted in a victory for the conservatives, who won 11 seats 
compared to four for the progressives.143 Ahn and Kim would resign as a result; 
however, Ahn’s departure from the NPAD is puzzling. 
When Ahn announced that he would leave the NPAD to create his own political 
party, his reason for departure was his inability to reform the NPAD as a member. 
Furthermore, Ahn called for the resignation of Moon to reform the leadership following 
their loss in the 2014 by-elections.144 During the by-elections, Ahn had the chance as the 
co-chair to reform the political process and proceed with an open candidate selection; 
however, it was Ahn who stuck to a party selection method. Therefore, it is puzzling as to 
why Ahn would blame Moon when he had the ability to make changes as the co-chair. 
Regardless, with Moon refusing to back down as the NPAD leader, Ahn would leave the 
party on December 2015 to create his own party, the People’s Party.145 It is also during 
this period that NPAD would change its party name to the Minjoo (Democratic) Party. 
Ahn’s defection is worrying for the Minjoo Party, as he managed to bring with him senior 
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progressive members from the NPAD. Furthermore, individuals that were cast aside by 
the Minjoo Party are turning toward the People’s Party in hopes of getting a fair chance 
of running in the upcoming (as of this writing) April 2016 elections. According to Gallup 
polls, the Minjoo Party holds a favorability rating of 26% compared to the People’s 
Party’s 9%;146 however, with the Minjoo Party’s recent announcement that it plans to 
incumbent party members for the upcoming April 2016 elections, it is likely that more 
individuals will join the People’s Party, and this might further legitimize the party.147 
Furthermore, since the progressives have grown fragmented through internal politics, it is 
likely that the conservatives, as one cohesive party, will win more seats than their 
progressives counterparts during the April 2016 National Assembly elections. 
D. CONTROL OF THE MEDIA 
In examining one-party dominance by the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, 
many analysts examine the internal structural advantages of the LDP that led to its 
dominance. Fewer try to link external factors to current LDP resurgence in Japan, 
specifically media influence by the government. In Japan, evidence suggests that there 
has been an increased amount of use of the media by the Prime Minister’s office 
compared to the past. In this section we will examine the structure/state of the Japanese 
media and possible advantages it provides to the LDP. Furthermore, we will explore 
whether these same factors apply to South Korea’s conservatives. 
1. Japan 
In Japan, there is a growing consensus that de facto press regulation has inhibited 
differentiation of media outlets from each other. Major newspapers and media outlets in 
Japan belong to press clubs (kisha), which serve as gateways for accessing government 
information. Furthermore, the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association 
(Nihon Shinbun Kyōkai) acts as an enforcer of rules and controls the behavior of the press 
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clubs. Additionally, without membership in the association, individuals do not have the 
ability to join press clubs and are denied access to news conferences and briefings by the 
Japanese government.148 As an example, when a school massacre occurred in Osaka 
Prefecture in 2001, individuals who were not members of the press clubs were barred 
from attending the police briefs; members of the press clubs were first provided with the 
information and it was later released to non-members.149 
Within the press clubs, reporters abide by an agreement called the kokuban kyōtei, 
also known as blackboard agreements; upcoming government briefs and news 
announcements are communicated via blackboards that are located in the press clubs.150 
The purpose of the blackboard agreement was to prevent competition among reporters 
who seek to obtain a better story than their colleagues and to equally distribute 
information to the press. Once an announcement is made under the blackboard system, 
journalists are barred from individually gathering information about that event. With 
these regulations within the press clubs, news is easily manipulated by the government, 
and at times the news media conveys information to the population that has been shaped 
by the government. Through this system, it becomes an effective method to control and 
incentivizes the government to maintain close ties with the press. 
Additionally, the LDP has tried to form a more personal relationship through 
“ban” (beat) journalism. In Japan, journalists sometimes have unfiltered access to the 
leadership in government; these individuals are known in Japan as ban-kisha. These 
individuals can be considered a part of the entourage of the politician; they start and end 
their day at the politician’s homes. Through this close interaction, ban-journalists are 
often given previews of important information that is not available through formal 
channels. This is with the understanding that the information available is all off-the-
record. Given the amount of time a ban-journalist spends with the politician and the 
information that is made available to them due to this close relationship, journalists often 
                                                 






find it difficult to write negative stories on these politicians. Furthermore, they avoid 
negative press in order to maintain their off-the-record information. Additionally, 
politicians will often invest in ban-journalists knowing that some of them will become 
editors of major news outlets in the future.151 This mutually exclusive relationship that 
politicians and ban-journalists share creates soft control of information in Japan. 
During the LDP’s period of greatest dominance, from 1955 to 1993, there were 
instances of deliberate media involvement in supporting politicians. With the dominance 
of the LDP during this timeframe, news media coverage centered on factional battles 
within the LDP instead of battles between political parties.152 During this period, the 
media took an active role to manipulate who would become the leader of the LDP. 
Journalists would also take an active role in aligning themselves with politicians and 
educating them on media behavior in hopes of advancing their positions within their 
media organization. Claims that Tsuneo Watanabe (Chairman and Editor in Chief) of the 
Yomiuri Shimbun assisted Yasuhiro Nakasone in becoming the LDP’s Prime Minister in 
1982 and organized a meeting between opposition leader Ichiro Ozawa (Democratic 
Party of Japan [DPJ]) and Prime Minister Fukuda (LDP) in 2007 give some credence to 
the idea that strong media influence over politics exists in Japan.153 
2. South Korea 
Unlike in Japan, the relationship between the Korean media and the government 
has been tumultuous. Korean media has been heavily controlled by the government. 
Before the 1952 elections, the president in South Korea was elected by the National 
Assembly; the party that held the majority of seats was most likely to win the presidency. 
During the National Assembly elections of 1952, the party of Rhee Syng-man lost the 
majority to their opponents. This jeopardized the reelection of Rhee Syng-man for the 
1952 presidential elections. In order to change his political outlook, President Rhee 
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declared martial law and imprisoned political opposition in the National Assembly.154 
Furthermore, he revised the presidential election system, changing it from a National 
Assembly vote to a popular vote. Additionally, in order to curb opposition and dissent, he 
passed the Extraordinary Measures on Publications in 1954 to control the media.155 In 
response, three dissenting newspapers (Chungang Sinmun, DongA Ilbo, and Chosun 
Ilbo), wrote critical reviews of President Rhee’s policies.156 In response, he required all 
newspaper agencies to be licensed and gave the state the right to censor material that was 
detrimental to it. Furthermore, the state gained the right to shut down newspapers that 
were detrimental to state affairs. Under the guise of the National Security Law, the 
president shut down all forms of opposition and silenced critics of the government. After 
the resignation of President Rhee in 1960, many of the stringent media laws enacted by 
President Rhee were abolished; Korea enjoyed a year free from persecution and 
censorship. During this period, a progressive newspaper was formed called the Minjok 
Ilbo; however, when President Park Chung-hee took office through a military coup in 
1961, the president of the Minjok Ilbo was executed.157 
During the presidency of Park Chung-hee, restrictions on the media were further 
tightened; this was the period when media formed a close partnership with the government. 
President Park is recognized as the individual that lifted South Korea out of poverty 
through an export oriented economy. He developed closed relationships with the chaebols 
to deliberately develop the companies into the economic pillars of Korean society. One of 
the methods of controlling business was control of funds available to businesses; this kept 
companies in check and forced them to comply with the government to receive support and 
incentives.158 During this period, big businesses started to move into the newspaper 
business in order to receive the benefits that were available by the government. 
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Under President Park, the Press Council Law was passed in 1964. Under this law, 
the government had the right to physically punish individuals that made false reports in 
the media; the boundaries of false reports were dictated by the government.159 While the 
government delayed the implementation of the Press Council Law, it was replaced by the 
Press Card System in 1970. Through the Press Card System, the government directly 
controlled the hiring process of the media and ensured the dismissal of individuals whose 
ideas did not align with the authoritarian party.160 In 1974, President Park implemented 
harsher laws to control the media. Journalists faced up to 15 years in prison for 
publishing material that was offensive to the government.161 Furthermore in 1975, 
President Park tightened the words of his 1974 policy. Through this new policy, in 
addition to publishing offensive material by journalists, he made it illegal to demonstrate 
against the government through “public media such as newspapers, broadcasts, or press 
services; or by any other means of expression, such as writings, books or recordings.”162 
Individuals faced up to 15 years in prison and the government had the authority to shut 
down media outlets that supported such expression. After the assassination of President 
Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan continued the policies of his predecessor and further 
tightened those policies. 
Like President Park Chung-hee, President Chun Doo-hwan took over the 
government through a military coup. Under the guise that the country was in danger, in 
1980 he enacted the “Determination for Nation Salvation.”163 President Chun removed 
172 periodical publishers that were not aligned to the views of the government. 
Furthermore, in order to narrow the amount of information circulating in society, he 
merged broadcasting stations, reducing their number from 28 to 11.164 Additionally, he 
enacted the Guidelines for Reporting which dictated what the press could or could not 
                                                 




163 Ibid., 1353. 
164 Ibid. 
 60
present through their media outlets.165 During his time in office, more than 400 
journalists were removed.166 
When the government transitioned from authoritarian rule to true democracy, 
restrictions on the media were also removed. Under the Basic Press Law, President Roh 
Tae-woo removed the Press Card System and the media no longer had to go through 
government censors before publishing. Immediately after the removal of government 
censors, “the number of daily papers doubled to 79, and 4600 weeklies and monthlies 
were now published.”167 During this period, progressive newspapers such as the 
Hankyoreh Sinmun were established and the press was allowed to unionize. While 
President Roh bought freedom of the press, he still had the ability to revert back to use of 
the National Security Law, which still gave him the ability to arrest individuals that the 
government felt as a threat to national security. In 1989, President Roh arrested thousands 
of individuals that he deemed to be “praising, encouraging or siding with anti-state 
organizations.”168 
a. Current Media Operations 
While press freedom has been operative since progressive President Kim Dae-
jung took power in 1998, there is still distrust of traditional media in South Korea. Even 
if the traditional media operates like their western counterparts, the government still has 
operational control over the media. To better understand the government’s role, these 
operational aspects of the Korean media will be explored. 
Similar to Japan, South Korea had a press club system called the Kijadan. The 
rules and operation of the press clubs and information sharing were similar to the kisha 
clubs of Japan—individuals who were not members of the club were denied access to 
government news releases. Unlike Japan, the consequences of breaking press club rules 
were more stringent in the case of Korea. In Japan, individuals who broke press club 
                                                 





rules would be barred temporarily and required to submit an apology letter to the press 
clubs. In South Korea, not only would the individual be barred from the press club, but 
the government would also pressure news organizations that continued to break press 
club rules. This would come in the form of government investigations into media outlets 
and as audits and tax investigations into members of the media. As in Japan, the 
government kept soft control over major news media organizations. 
Furthermore, the state’s control over public media can be seen through the 
appointment process of the president and its board members. For this study, two media 
broadcasting companies will be analyzed: the government owned Korean Broadcasting 
System (KBS) and limited company Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC). Being a 
state owned enterprise, KBS has its president appointed by the president of South Korea, 
and its board members are also appointment by the president, with recommendations 
made by the Korean Communications Commission (KCC).169 MBC is owned by two 
entities; the Foundation for Broadcast Culture (a public corporation in which the 
government has a 70% stake) and the Jung-soo Foundation (30% stake).170 The members 
of the Foundation for Broadcast Culture (FBC) are appointed by the KCC, who in turn 
appoints the president. Since there is heavy influence by the government, presidents and 
board members change depending upon who holds the presidency. 
When President Roh Moo-hyun (Progressive) took office in 2003, he proceeded 
to replace the heads of both KBS and MBC with personnel supportive of his cause. As 
the President of KBS, President Roh appointed Jung Yeon-jo, a former employee of the 
progressive newspaper Hankyoreh Daily and supporter of the Roh administration.171 As 
the President of MBC, he appointed Choi Moon-soon, a hardline progressive.172 After 
taking office, Choi proceeded to replace the heads of 17 of 19 regional MBC stations 
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with individuals who were supportive of the progressive party.173 In 2008, 10 days before 
the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak (Conservative), President Roh appointed 
Eom Ki-young to lead MBC.174 While this analysis displays the amount of control the 
government has over the media, it still does not explain the public’s mistrust of 
mainstream media; the catalyst for this mistrust can be found in 2005. 
b. PD Notebook—2005 
In 2004, Professor Hwang Woo-suk came into prominence when he published 
work claiming to clone the first human embryos and extract their stem cells.175 In 2005, 
he made headlines when his team claimed to have cloned the first dog.176 Through his 
achievements, he was heralded as a hero by the national media and called the pride of 
Korea. Going against the vein of the mainstream media, MBC’s PD Notebook questioned 
the validity of the work done by Professor Hwang; they specifically brought into question 
the human stem cell research conducted by the research team. Soon afterwards, PD 
Notebook was vilified by the media and citizens for attempting to tarnish the work done 
by Professor Hwang. Newspaper outlets such as the Chosun, JoongAng, and Dong-A all 
rallied against PD Notebook.177 Shortly after the program aired, MBC was forced to 
apologize for the work produced by the investigative program and was forced off the air 
for an extended period of time. On December 2005, PD Notebook was vindicated when 
an academic panel found that Professor Hwang fabricated his 2005 claims of cloning a 
dog.178 Furthermore, the same panel found that his 2004 work on stem cell research was 
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also fabricated.179 In the aftermath, PD Notebook earned the label of being an accurate 
and honest program, while other media outlets were ridiculed for covering the media with 
emotion rather than facts. When PD Notebook earned the reputation of being an honest 
and accurate program from its viewers, it was easily manipulated by progressive 
supporters to run a disruption campaign against the conservatives in 2008. 
c. PD Notebook—2008 
From 1998 to 2008, the Korean presidency was held by the progressive party of 
Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. February 2008 marked the transition from a progressive 
presidency to a conservative presidency. Two months after entering office, President Lee 
Myung-bak entered into negotiations with the United States over importing beef into South 
Korea. The two sides failed to negotiate on two previous occasions. In 2003, talks failed 
over mad cow disease in the U.S.180 In 2007, talks stalled when bone fragments were found 
on imported beef.181 In 2008, the United States was adamant that the Free Trade 
Agreement would not be passed if Korea would not make concessions on the importation 
on U.S. beef into the country.182 In the end, President Lee agreed to the demands of the 
United States to start beef importation into Korea. When news got out of the president’s 
decision, the public was wary because of the incidents that occurred in 2003 and 2007. 
The progressives’ supporters saw this as an opportunity and used PD Notebook to 
help stop the beef imports. Eleven days after the agreement between South Korea and the 
U.S., PD Notebook ran a segment calling into question the safety of United States beef and 
its dangers. Immediately after broadcasting their segment, it caused mass hysteria around 
the country, with citizens coming out into the streets to protest the decision of the 
president.183 The protests grew out of control, to the point that barricades were made with 
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shipping containers to block the entrance to the Blue House.184 Furthermore, because of the 
pressure of the protests, multiple cabinet ministers resigned in attempts to quell the 
protestors.185 
Two months after PD Notebook aired the segment on U.S. beef, the Ministry of 
Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries requested an investigation into PD Notebook 
for fact distortion. As mentioned earlier, the president of MBC was appointed by a 
progressive president. Thus, there was no shock to the evidence found by the prosecution 
against PD Notebook. In investigating the scriptwriter (Kim Eun-hee) for PD Notebook, 
prosecutors found emails that showed bias against the conservative president. In an email 
conversation, Ms. Kim states, 
While I’ve been looking for an item for PD Notebook, I was looking for 
ways to release my indignation over the outcome of the general election…I 
really get into making a program one or two times a year…This year’s mad 
cow disease was one of them. I think that was because anger over Lee 
Myung-bak was at a peak at that time after the general election. Because 
I’m still very interested in the “fate of Lee,” I’ve spent a lot of time 
watching the candlelight vigils and looking at Agora on Daum.186 
Furthermore, the translator for the show testified to prosecutors that the producers 
were purposefully misinterpreting information to fit their agenda. She stated that “PD 
Diary’s producers should have considered more thoroughly the possibility that the 
downer cow [that appeared in the broadcast] was actually infected with the disease. They 
should have provided an accurate impression about such a possibility to their viewers.”187 
d. Control of Media by Conservatives 
In the fallout of the PD Notebook segment, President Lee Myung-bak took 
measures to control major media outlets. Three months after the PD Notebook segment, 
the KCC fired the KBS president and replaced him with a former aide to President 
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Lee.188 This process was not difficult, as the KCC president was also President Lee’s 
campaign advisor during the presidential elections. The KCC further replaced the 
presidents of Yonhap Television News Station (YTN) and Arirang TV (a channel that 
provides Korean news in English) with supporters of President Lee during his 
presidential campaign.189 The most critical replacement was the President of the Korean 
Broadcasting Advertising Corporation (KOBACO). KOBACO was an agency that 
represented all the broadcasting companies in Korea; on behalf of all the broadcasters, it 
sells advertising time to companies.190 Control of KOBACO provided President Lee to 
control the media. If the KCC, on behalf of the president, were to blacklist companies, 
their advertising capabilities would be severely compromised. Therefore, control of 
KOBACO ensured that companies were supportive of the ruling party. 
To further control the media, President Lee passed media reforms that allowed 
newspaper companies to also own a media company. Before these reforms, the two types 
of entities were separated to prevent undue influence over the media. The idea behind the 
liberalization law was to create more competition and provide differentiated news to 
society.191 While President Lee’s intent was to open the market to competition, he only 
flooded the media market with more conservative news outlets. When the Korean 
government decided to grant channel rights after deregulating the media market in 2009, 
the top three conservative newspapers in South Korea were granted channels. They were 
Chosun Ilbo (TV Chosun), Joong-ang Ilbo (JTBC) and Dong-A Ilbo (Channel A). 
Furthermore, after the deregulation of the media market, it was more beneficial to be 
aligned with the government. Howard explains that “members of the private media 
corporations were often rewarded by the government in the forms of interest-free loans, 
tax favors, political offices, bureaucratic roles, and government positions.”192 
Furthermore they had access to government funds for, “overseas travel, housing loans, 
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money for their children’s education, and the more traditional forms of graft, cash and 
gifts.”193 Therefore, a perception exists within Korean civil society that big media only 
reports news that is within the spectrum of the government, in order to take advantage of 
the advertising outlets provided by the government. Furthermore, the president’s 
influence over other media outlets gives him considerable power to abuse the media. 
In South Korea, an irony exists in regards to the government and media. It is 
evident that manipulation and control over the media exists; however, citizens seem to 
separate the two entities in regards to trust. In a study conducted by Edelman, trust in the 
media was rated at 60% while trust in the government was rated at 40%.194 Furthermore, 
the top three trusted news sources were identified as KBS (state), Chosun Ilbo 
(Conservative), and JoongAng Ilbo (Conservative).195 Although citizens realize that there 
is heavy influence by the government on mainstream media and conservative media 
outlets, they still turn toward them for information. 
While conservatives have an advantage in the number of conservative news 
outlets, the manipulation of the media to advance conservative party agenda is 
questionable. Since the days of the authoritarian regime, evidence suggests that the 
government of South Korea has made efforts to control the media though laws and 
regulations in regards to the information that is reported from news agencies; however, 
media manipulation is not a unilateral advantage held by the conservatives. The 
progressives have also manipulated the media after taking office and have managed to 
disrupt policies of the conservatives. Therefore, it is difficult to consider the 
conservatives as having dominance over the media and thereby garnering votes for their 
party. 
  
                                                 
193 Howard, “Korean Media Bias,” 66. 





This thesis set out to explore the possibility of one-party dominance by the 
conservatives in South Korea. It defined one-party dominance in the context of South 
Korea and explored its potential causes, with reference to the causes of Liberal 
Democratic Party dominance in Japan. The findings are inconclusive with regard to the 
possibility of one-party dominance by the conservatives in South Korea. 
A. PEMPELS’ THREE DIMENSIONS OF ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE—
SOUTH KOREA 
For the purposes of this thesis, and based on Pempel’s work, one-party dominance 
is defined by dominance in three dimensions: dominance in number, in bargaining 
position, and chronologically. 
In defining dominance in number and bargaining position in South Korea, a party 
might be said to fall into one of four categories, depending on its control of the 
presidency and its number of seats in the National Assembly: no, weak, strong, and 
complete dominance. Before the National Assembly Advancement Act of 2012, a party 
that held a simple majority (151 seats) could pass bills unilaterally through the National 
Assembly. After the passage of the 2012 Act, parties have needed to hold a three-fifths 
majority to bring a bill up to the plenary session to be voted upon by the National 
Assembly. Even though no party has obtained a three-fifths majority in the National 
Assembly in the history of democratic South Korea, dominance in number and 
bargaining position can still be achieved by holding the presidency. Since the president 
has veto powers over the National Assembly, if the president’s party does not hold a 
simple majority over the opposition, it is forced to compromise with the incumbent party. 
The varying degrees of dominance that a party can achieve are summarized in Tables 1 
and 2. 
In regards to defining chronological dominance, this thesis settled on Sartori’s 
definition of three consecutive winning elections. In South Korea, no political party after 
democratization has won three consecutive majority elections in the National Assembly 
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or for the presidency. Currently, the conservative party has won two consecutive National 
Assembly and presidential elections. According to Sartori’s definition, the conservatives 
are one majority win away in the National Assembly and presidential elections from 
meeting the criteria of chronological dominance. 
B. CAUSES OF ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE—SOUTH KOREA 
This thesis focused on three factors that helped the Liberal Democratic Party to 
become a dominant party in Japan. The first was the LDP’s use of pork barrel to draw 
votes to the party. Voters were specifically attracted to candidates who could draw pork 
to their region, which allowed the LDP to dominate in elections over the opposition. In 
South Korea, pork is mostly controlled by the president, with little input from the 
National Assembly; this is made possible by Article 54 of the South Korea constitution, 
which gives the president power to create the budget. Furthermore, pork barrel in South 
Korea is distributed in the form of national subsidies, which can be directly manipulated 
by the central government. But while Horiuchi, S. Lee, Kim, H. Lee, and Woo try to link 
pork barrel to voting, the evidence is inconclusive. This thesis did argue that subsidy 
distribution to the conglomerates in South Korea matters. Although progressives favor 
minimizing the power that the conglomerates hold in South Korea, they are forced to 
work with them in order to further their political agenda. Furthermore, given the close 
association between the conservatives and the conglomerates, when the economy is at the 
forefront of elections, a majority of voters might default to the conservatives. Overall, 
given both parties’ equal opportunity to distribute pork in South Korea, neither party 
holds an advantage in this area. 
In Japan, another cause of LDP dominance was the fragmentation of opposition 
parties. In South Korea, similarly, both the conservatives and progressives have had 
instances in which internal fragmentation lost them the presidency. Currently, the 
progressives are fragmented into three different parties: the Minjoo, People’s and Justice 
Parties. If history is any indication, if the progressives remain fragmented, the 
conservatives will most likely take the majority votes from the progressives during the 
National Assembly elections on April 2016. Furthermore, if this continues into the 2017 
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presidential elections, the conservatives will most likely win the presidency. If that 
occurs, the conservative party will have achieved chronological dominance. But the 
conservatives have suffered from fragmentation in the past as well. 
Lastly, in examining the media as a source of one-party dominance in South 
Korea, no party holds an advantage. In Japan, the media naturally vectored toward the 
dominant LDP, providing favors and censoring material that would bring a bad image 
toward the party. Through its position as the dominant party, the LDP was able to 
passively manipulate the media to its advantage. In examining South Korea, the same 
advantages do not exist; the media is centrally controlled by the government, such that 
whoever takes the presidency is able to manipulate the media to his or her advantage. 
Furthermore, since the government has control over how the media earns revenue 
through advertising, the media is more inclined to support the incumbent party. If party 
dominance is ever achieved in South Korea, media control might reinforce this, but the 
media likely will not help create party dominance in the first place. 
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